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ARTISTIC AND PRUDENTIAL JUDGMENT

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Artists and moralists have seldom been on the best of terms. The rift between them first began when Plato ousted the poets from his ideal republic; and, if one can judge from the present row over censorship, the rift today is as wide as ever.

Significantly enough, contemporary Neo-Scholastic teaching has tended to affirm this rift rather than to attempt to heal it. One need not read very long in the writings of Maritain and Adler, for instance, before one discovers that art and the moral virtue of prudence are by nature in separate realms entirely, prudence in the realm of the moral good, art in the realm of amoral and transcendental beauty; that the prudential judgment never affects the art object as such; and that within his own sphere of activity the artist is free from the *do*'s and *don't*'s of moral censure.[1] Though apparently we have been unable to mend the breach between art and morality, it is, perhaps, a credit to the tolerance of our age that we have at least learned to live with it.

On the other hand, Walter Kerr, in a very stimulating lecture,[2] has recently called for a revision of Christian aesthetics to cope with the problem of the relationship of art and morality. In commenting upon the tensions that exist between the art critic and the censor, Kerr remarks that "there is no resolving our present dilemma, no escaping the increasing tensions of a tug-of-war in which both parties are committed to unalterable positions, except by the rational development of a demonstrative, defensible aesthetic."[3]

The present article will, perhaps, be a step toward such an aesthetic. In it I shall attempt to restate and in part to resolve the whole complex problem of the relationship of art and prudence.

The traditional Neo-Scholastic doctrine on the relation of art and prudence has for the most part been developed from a series of texts in the *Summa Theologiae* in which St. Thomas discusses the relationship

of the two virtues of *ars* and *prudentia*. According to this reading of the Thomistic texts art (*ars*) is to be defined as *recta ratio factibilium*. Although this habit is a virtue of the practical intellect, it also has a speculative side inasmuch as it is expressible in a determined body of rules. As an imperfect virtue, art is ordered not to the good of man as such but to the good of the object which it produces. Hence, the nature of art, though not its exercise, lies outside the pale of morality; for, since art is not a moral virtue, it can be governed by prudential judgment only extrinsically—that is, as to its acquisition, use, or social consequences. Hence, every art object must be subjected to two separate and *unrelated* judgments, one as to its aesthetic value, the other as to its moral consequences.

The basic fallacy of this position lies in the assumption that the Thomistic definition of *ars* as *recta ratio factibilium* is an adequate description of the habit of poetry, painting, sculpture, and so on. This assumption, I suggest, is a false one.

Recta ratio factibilium is an adequate description of the habit which enables a man to engage in such activity as the making of pots, pans, and other *useful instruments*. However, before one can apply the definition *recta ratio factibilium* without qualification to the production of a poem, sculpture, painting, and so forth, one must determine whether or not there is an essential difference between a pot and a painting. For clearly, if the products of habits are essentially irreducible, the habits which produce them will likewise be essentially irreducible.

Hence, the question which confronts us at this point is this: Is a pot the same thing as a painting? We shall in the future designate the pot and like articles of human productivity as "artifacts," whereas we shall reserve the term "works of art" or "art objects" for music, sculpture, painting, and the like. Is then every work of art an artifact, and is every artifact a work of art?

[1]The reader might find it interesting to compare the following contemporary Neo-Scholastic treatments of the relationship of art and prudence: M. Adler, *Art and Prudence* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1937), pp. 418-54; J. Maritain, *Art and Scholasticism* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1930), chaps. 4 and 9, and *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1955), pp. 48-52, 58-61; Ralph McInerny, "Apropos of Art and Connaturality," THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXXV (March 1958), 173-89.

[2]*Criticism and Censorship* (Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1956).

[3]*Ibid.*, p. 82.

One of the clearest characteristics of the artifact is that it is an object which has a particular use. Pots, pans, tables, chairs, and the like, are all functional objects which partake of the nature of tools. They are instruments which extend and support the various practical external activities of man.

Works of art may also serve practical purposes. They may be used to serve as gifts, to cover a wall, to fill an empty corner, and so on. Nevertheless, to use a painting as a gift is not to use it as a painting. In the last analysis, any material thing, be it a button or a ten-dollar bill, can serve as a gift. Hence, its giveableness does not qualify to constitute a painting as a work of art. What does constitute a painting formally as a work of art is the peculiar sort of *knowableness* proper to a work of art. We must explain why this is so.

Art objects are not useless objects, but their use is speculative rather than practical. Considered as a work of art, a painting has *no other function* than to be known. An artifact too is knowable, but its knowability is always in function of some further practical end. One does not contemplate a hammer, but one recognizes its use and employs it. Once you have seen a Rembrandt there is nothing else you can do with it precisely as a work of art.

Hence we may conclude that an artifact is an instrument to be used, whereas an art object is an expression to be known.

This is an important distinction, for it shows that the artifact achieves the perfection of its being only by *being used*, whereas the art object achieves the perfection of its being only by *being known*. Indeed, the art object achieves its formal existence as art (expression) only in knowledge.

That this is so is clearest in the case of poetry and music. The being of a poem does not consist formally in the ink blots on the pages of a closed book or in the disturbances in the air set up by a person who recites the poem. These are the material conditions, no more; for the poem's formal existence is in the mind of the person who understands it. The same can be said of music, which is formally neither the notation on the page nor the air vibrations set up by the instruments.

That the art object achieves formal existence as art only in the mind is less clear in the case of painting and sculpture than it is in the case of poetry and music. Pigment, canvas, stone, and clay all have

physical existence more substantial than the physical prerequisites for poetic or musical communication. But the printed poem and the pigment-covered canvas are nevertheless identical with the air vibrations of a musical note in this; namely, that insofar as each enters into the constitution of an art object, each is *nothing more* than the material conditions necessary for artistic communication. The fact that a painting lasts longer than the vibrations of a note does not, for all that, make it art any more formally.[4]

Architecture is in many ways the most difficult of the arts to handle. Its functional nature makes it most like a pure artifact. Indeed, insofar as a building is functional it is an artifact, and a purely functional building is only an artifact. Architecture attains to the stature of art only when it is not simply functional but also expressive. (Think, for instance, of the cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris.)

I have been attempting here to arrive at a notion of the nature of the habit of art through an analysis of the nature of objects of art. By now it should be clear, I think, that art is essentially the ability to communicate knowledge by way of a material medium. The object of art is that material medium itself molded to fit the needs of artistic communication. But the habit of art always and of its nature looks beyond the art object to the mind of the person who will view the object, and the art object itself has as its *sole function* as art object (*finis operis*) to communicate artistic knowledge. Indeed, the work of art exists only materially in the art object itself; it exists formally only in the mind of the person who knows the object.

Let us explore briefly some of the implications of this analysis. Communication has a double aspect. It can be viewed from the point of view of the communicator (actively) or from the point of view of the communicand (passively). Taken formally and in its fullest sense, communication includes both active and passive elements.

Actively considered, communication does not take place formally unless the communicator deliberately intends to communicate, although communication passively considered could take place formally without the intention of the communicator to communicate. If com-

[4]Gilson has written intelligently on this particular point; but he tends to overemphasize, I believe, the artistic existence of the physical painting. Cf. *Painting and Reality* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1957), pp. 4-28.

[5]The word "total" must be insisted upon; otherwise there is no point in even discussing the case.

munication is simply passive, however, it is not communication properly so called. For example, I may happen to overhear someone saying something which he has no intention of communicating to me.

Consider now the case of a man who sits down at a piano apparently to compose a song but with the *total*[5] *absence* of any intention to communicate. As far as he is concerned, the whole of his activity terminates at himself and himself alone. It is not that he definitely excludes others; he simply does not consider them. They are nonentities to him. For him, therefore, his musical notations and the playing of the notes are simply and solely a crutch to his own thoughts; and the working out of the song is identical with the doodling a person might indulge in to help himself clarify his own ideas.

Note well, however, that the man at the piano is not communicating to himself. "To communicate to oneself" is strictly a metaphor. He is simply thinking, with the sounds he makes on the piano to aid his thought. If he proceeds through the entire process of song writing without ever adverting to another self to whom he is directing what he is doing (however implicitly he may advert to it), then from the point of view of the pianist what is produced is not art. That is to say, actively considered it is not art; and hence the object (song) which results from this activity is not formally an art object. Only when the pianist recognizes the fact that his musical doodling (a fact to which he has been so far totally oblivious) is something intelligible to others and only when this fact appears to him as a desirable good does he convert the musical doodling, which till now has been only materially an art object, into an art object formally so called.

Let us suppose, however, that the pianist never gets past the stage of musical doodling. A person in the next room hears him at the piano. *Per accidens* what he hears becomes for him an artistic expression, although in itself the musical doodling is nothing of the sort. Nevertheless, what is an art object only passively considered is not an art object strictly and simply.

I have said that the art object is simply the material conditions of artistic communication. The word "communication" is to be understood in this context in its fullest and most formal sense; that is, both actively and passively. In itself a song is intelligible sound. A

song does not become an art object until it is put forth *as an expression (to another)* of the inner state of the artist.

I would be happy if I could terminate this analysis of art here. But to say that the art object is a material medium of communication in no way distinguishes the art object from the most prosaic conversation on the price of eggs. What formally distinguishes the art object from other communication media is the kind of knolwedge it communicates.

I have defined art as a kind of formal expression. Expression always involves a grasp of things in a knowledge relationship. Now, every knowledge relationship involves a subject (knower) and an object (thing known) of knowledge. Since man is not only a knower but a reflective knower, he is aware not only of things but of *himself* as being aware of things.

Hence, knowledge may be either subject-centered or object-centered. Knowledge is object-centered when it seeks to be strictly objective; that is, when it seeks to get at the nature of a thing as it is in itself and independently of the knower. Object-centered knowledge need not be merely knowledge of things outside the self. Indeed, I can treat myself as an object of knowledge by seeking to know myself in my objective nature and apart from any preconstructed self-concepts I may possess. This treatment of the self constitutes the burden of rational psychology. What makes rational psychology object-centered knowledge is that from first to last the rational psychologist regards himself impersonally, in the same way as he might regard a stone or a dead frog which he wished to subject to mathematical or biological analysis. The sole concern of object-centered knowledge is to achieve objective certitude, and it is most perfect in the sciences of philosophy and theology.

[6]*Creative Intuition*, pp. 9-34.

[7]This personalized knowledge turns up even in narrative poetry. The story of Achilles, for example, is not simply a tall tale like the legends of Pecos Bill. Achilles, like the words which tell of him, is himself an expression of something else. He is a symbolic expression of *humanity* in the concrete. The community of nature existing between Homer and Achilles grounds the possibility of an *artistic* narration. Because Achilles is not simply Achilles but a concretization of tragic humanity, he is in some sense identical with the poet Homer himself. In grasping Achilles as tragic man the poet grasps himself as tragic man. What distinguishes narrative from lyric poetry is the fact that the narrative poet grasps himself as a concrete human universal indirectly—that is, by reflection on the experiences of another—whereas the lyric poet grasps himself directly, by reflection on his own inner experience.

Subject-centered knowledge, on the other hand, is essentially a personalized form of knowledge. Here Maritain's remarks in his opening chapters of *Creative Intuition* are extremely suggestive.[6] In subject-centered knowledge, the knower's main concern is with himself as experiencing an object. The drive of subject-centered knowledge is toward the uncovering of my personalized reactions to the world about me, which has been imported into me through my knowing faculties. Subject-centered knowledge is capable of degrees, but it finds its most perfect expression in artistic knowledge. We shall discuss later to what extent this artistic knowledge is concerned with objective certitude.

In artistic knowledge, subject-centered knowledge becomes formally universalized. That is to say, in artistic knowledge a man is not only reflectively concerned with his reaction to things about him, but he recognizes his reaction as being a *typically human* one and hence communicable. He looks upon himself as a concretized universal, as undergoing an experience which is irreducibly and irrevocably his own, while at the same time being an experience of a sort common to the race of men. This realization is throughout a personalized one and inspires the artist with the desire to communicate his experience in its irreducibly personalized form.[7]

Thus to be an artist a man must not only have trained himself to think artistically; he must be able to communicate his artistic thought to others in its personalized form. Such a communication requires an apt medium as well as the mastery of that medium by the artist.

Command of the medium has a double aspect. It implies the mechanical skills necessary to mold the medium, like the ability to wield brush or hammer; and it also involves the ability to detect the possibilities of communication latent in any given medium and capable of serving the needs of personalized expression. El Greco is said to have remarked once of Michelangelo that, as a painter, the Italian was a good man but simply did not know how to paint. Indeed, most of Michelangelo's paintings remind one of the outlines of projected statues colored with pigment rather than genuine paintings. Magnificent as the frescoes of the Sistine Chapel are in what they express, one feels that on a technical level the artist has failed to exploit the full potentialities of his medium.

The arts, then, possess a loose unity of noetic content. This content consists in the personalized and reflective grasp of oneself as a concretized human universal in one's experience of things as they are or as they are thought to be. Particular objects of art differ in the manner in which they particularize and specify this generic content of artistic knowledge. The different artistic genres on the other hand are diversified solely by reason of the material medium of expression. A painter expresses his insight in pigment; a musician, in plastic sound; a poet, in significant language. Yet poet, painter, and musician all express an insight which is generically the same in content.

Since, however, artistic thought is expressed in and through a medium, the medium will of necessity affect the thought expressed both in the content and in the mode of expression.

As to the mode of expression, the medium will determine to a large extent the clarity with which the artist can express himself. Certainly, conceptual language, the medium of poetry, is a clearer medium of expression than colored pigments, the medium of painting, or than plastic sound, the medium of music. If, however, the artist is a man of any sort of capability, there will always be present in his work a minimum core of artistic knowledge; and this knowledge will be a more particularized version of the generic content of artistic knowledge as we have described it.

As to the content of expression, the medium will limit the possibilities for particularizing the generic content of artistic knowledge. There are some experiences which can be expressed by music which cannot be expressed by poetry, painting, and so on. And the same is true of any one of the arts with reference to any of the others.

A few words concerning music as a medium of expression may serve as a clarification. One may listen to music in various ways; for instance, as a progression of sounds. The man engrossed in a book and only vaguely conscious of music being played in the background would exemplify this type of listener. Again, one may listen to music as suggestive of various past experiences and associations, like the man who hears a song which sets him dreaming about a childhood sweetheart. Again, one may listen to music as a formal structure and determine the number and order of the themes and the place of their insertion into the score as the piece progresses.

In none of these cases is the listener listening to music as a work of

art. This occurs only when one formally attends to the music as being *expressive* of the inner state of the artist. To hear music as sound, as suggestive of images, or as a formal structure is to hear it as divorced from the artist who wrote it. No work of art can be appreciated as art if it is so divorced from its maker, for to know a work of art as divorced from its maker is not to know it as the expression of subject-centered knowledge. Rather, it is to know the art object simply as an object; that is, to know it with object-centered knowledge as a thing of such-and-such a determined nature.

A few words are necessary here concerning the relationship of subject-centered and object-centered knowledge found in artistic expression as the personalized and reflective grasp of one's reaction to things as they are or as they are known. This last phrase, "as they are known," is an important one and deserves closer consideration.

Object-centered knowledge seeks to get at the nature of things as they are in themselves, as divorced from the knowing subject. While subject-centered knowledge concentrates upon the reactions of the knowing subject, subject-centered knowledge can never dispense with, or divorce itself from, the natures of things outside the mind. A subject always grasps himself as reacting to an object of a determined nature. Subject-centered knowledge is not interested primarily in the critical examination of the nature of things. In subject-centered knowledge the knower tends to accept uncritically his impressions of the nature of the world about him and then to concentrate upon his personalized reactions to things as they impress him.

As a result, the expression of subject-centered knowledge will display *two levels of truth*. The first level of truth consists in the accurate description of the personalized reaction of the subject to his conception of things. For example, a poet might express in a sonnet his grief that (as he is convinced) the soul of man must perish with the body. He will attain to the first level of truth if he accurately conveys the sentiment of grief he feels. For lack of a better term we will call this first level of truth subject-centered truth.

The second level of truth within subject-centered knowledge concerns the accurate expression of the natures of those things in themselves to which the subject is reacting in a personalized manner. At this level of truth we find the importation of object-centered knowledge (and

hence of objective truth and falsity) into a subject-centered experience. This object-centered knowledge is no mere adjunct to subject-centered knowledge; it is an integral part of subject-centered knowledge and essential to the perfection of subject-centered knowledge. The poet mentioned in the preceding paragraph failed precisely at this second level of truth. Similarly, Walt Whitman spends a great deal of time in *Song of Myself* giving voice to his personalized realization of his pantheistic oneness with all things. We may presume that Mr. Whitman has told accurately the way he felt in this matter; but we may question (better, deny and censure) the objective truth of the world view upon which his subjective reaction is based.

We are at last in a position to draw some conclusions concerning the relation of art to morality and prudence. In the course of these conclusions, I shall refer to the habit of producing artifacts as *craft* and the habit of producing art objects as *art*.

Craft is a habit of the practical intellect which is correctly defined as *recta ratio factibilium*. It is an imperfect virtue inhering in the intellect, expressible in an organized body of rules and independent of the moral virtues. The nature of craft considered in itself lies outside the pale of morality.

Art is correctly described as an acquired ability to communicate artistic knowledge to another through the use of an apt material medium. Hence, at least two things are required in art: (1) the ability to think artistically—that is, the ability to think along the subject-centered lines which we have described; (2) the ability to communicate this knowledge to another via some apt material medium.

Because of the material medium of communication, art necessarily implies craft; but art is not simply craft. The art object is no more than the necessary condition of artistic communication. However, the activity of an artist as a craftsman is only materially artistic activity. As a craftsman the artist seeks in his activity the good of the art object considered in itself. But as an artist formally considered, he seeks

[8]*Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 109, a. 3, ad 1.

[9]Maritain defines the beautiful as an amalgam of the three transcendentals: one, good, and true. The simultaneous and formal grasp of "the radiance of all the transcendentals united" is a feat of mental gymnastic which I for one am quite unable to perform. The beautiful, I believe, is more aptly defined as being insofar as it is capable of exciting the sort of subject-centered knowledge we have described above as artistic knowledge. Cf. Maritain, *Creative Intuition*, p. 162.

in his activity not the good of the object itself but the good of that other person or persons with whom he is trying to communicate. Similarly, a person needs some command of language in order to speak the truth, but when he tells the truth a person is not formally engaging in the craft of the grammarian. Just so, the artist as artist is not formally engaged in the craft of painting.

One may have acquired, for instance, the craft of making model ships. Art and craft are similar in this that the consistency which obtains between the artifact and its blueprint is similar to the consistency that obtains between the completed work of art and the visual-auditile pattern in the imagination of the artist. The significant difference between the model ship and the art object is that the model ship simply copies; it does not express, whereas the sole function of the art object as such is to be an expression.

The ability to communicate knowledge of an artistic nature involves, therefore, habits both of the practical and of the speculative intellect. For insofar as art involves materially some craft, it is a virtue of the practical intellect; while insofar as it involves the habit of thinking artistically, it is a habit of the speculative intellect.

However, the communication of knowledge to another is also essentially a moral act. The very production of an object whose sole function is the communication of knowledge involves the setting up of a communication situation on the part of the artist. Hence, no artist can be in a state of indifference as to the truth content of the knowledge he expresses. Moreover, since man is by nature social, he is morally bound to perform those actions which are necessary for the preservation of human society. Now, human society is impossible unless men can believe one another. Hence, the man who freely sets out to express his mind on any subject is morally bound to express his mind truthfully.[8]

Thus, to reduce art to the amoral seeking of a transcendental beauty is to betray its essentially moral character.[9] Indeed, if we regard the end of the artistic creation itself (*finis operis*), the creative action of the artist has no other end than the production of an object whose *sole purpose* as art object is to convey knowledge to some viewer. Because it is the attempt to communicate and not mere craft, art belongs properly to the moral order.

At this point we might recall the two levels of truth to be found in any artistic expression. At the level of subject-centered truth, the artist is truthful if he communicates to the best of his ability that personalized reaction which he desires to communicate. At this level of truth successful communication is the only adequate criterion of the truth of the work; for at this level of truth the evidence is irreducibly personal to the artist.

At the level of object-centered truth, however, where an objective view of the world is imported into the art object as the cause of the artist's personalized reaction, the natures of things in themselves become the norm of the truthfulness of the art object; and at this level of truth any intellect capable of grasping the natures of things is qualified to judge the truthfulness of the art object.

At the level of subject-centered truth there is no real moral problem, since it is highly improbable that an artist would freely set out to deceive his audience concerning his reactions to the world as he sees it. The question of morality does become acute, however, at the level of object-centered truth. For no artist can set out to deceive the public concerning the nature of the world. Moreover, any art object propounding a false view of the world is *ipso facto* in itself censurable, even if the intentions of the artist are of the best.

However, a moral failure at either level of truth is *also an artistic failure*. Since art is essentially the ability to communicate a particular form of knowledge, any defect either in the matter or in the manner of communication is also an artistic failure. Hence, to the extent that the artist fails to communicate true knowledge, he fails precisely as an artist. Truth is a perfection of knowledge. To the extent that knowledge is not true it is not even knowledge. To fail to communicate true knowledge is to fail precisely in one's function as a communicator (artist).

Hence, the perfect artist is the one who communicates perfectly his personalized reactions to the world as it actually exists; and no art object can assert that to be true which is false or that to be good which is evil.

We may conclude from all of this that art is a part of the virtue of truthfulness. Truthfulness is the habit of speaking the truth.[10] The

[10]*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 109, a. 1.
[11]*Ibid.*, a. 2, ad 3.
[12]*Criticism and Censorship*, p. 86.

virtue of truthfulness involves two things: (1) the representation of things as they are without distortion; (2) the communication of truth when it is fitting and in the manner in which it is fitting.[11] The artist as the perfect communicator of artistic knowledge will not only impart his vision truthfully; he will also speak when he is called upon to speak and be silent when his silence is required. With regard to the fitting communication of artistic knowledge, however, one should note that the personalized nature of artistic knowledge endows art with a greater freedom with regard to what precisely is fitting in time and manner of expression than one would find in other forms of expression of a more prosaic nature. (Take, for instance, ordinary conversation.) To be too strict in this regard would be to threaten (imprudently) the existence of art itself, since often a work of art must be struck off while the intuition is still at white heat. Often, too, the very personalized nature of the experience to be expressed will require the most unconventional idiosyncrasies in the manner of expression, if the experience is to be expressed at all.

Since artistic expression is limited to a particular kind of knowledge, it is not simply identical with the moral virtue of veracity; but it is a part of that moral virtue. From this fact important conclusions follow. (1) Truth alone does not qualify to constitute a particular expression as artistic. In addition to being true the art object must also express genuine artistic knowledge. (2) There is no real conflict between art and prudence. Prudence is directive of all the moral virtues, including the moral virtue of truthfulness. Nevertheless, the perfectly prudent artist is communicative with a prudence which of necessity takes into account the peculiar nature of artistic knowledge and the needs of artistic communication.

The conflict between art and prudence really arises only in the mind of one who attempts to reduce art to the level of mere craft. Indeed, Walter Kerr was very near the truth when he remarked, "The defender of art and the defender of prudence are actually interested in the same objectives, in slightly different proportions. Each really wants good art, though neither has as yet been careful to make explicit the idea of good art."[12] To judge a work of art as a piece of craftsmanship is not to judge it formally as a work of art. Good craftsmanship is necessary

to good art; but good art is judged formally on the basis of the knowledge content of the work of art, although the content of any given work will be conditioned by the employment of the medium to express that knowledge content.

This identification of art with a part of the moral virtue of truthfulness in no way reduces art to the level of didacticism. Didacticism in art is the substitution within an art form of object-centered for subject-centered knowledge. Didacticism is simply sermonizing, and sermonizing always leaves the sermon-giver out of the picture. Artistic didacticism is merely sermonizing in an artistic medium. It is not art because it is not the expression of artistic knowledge. Hence, as long as artistic knowledge remains personalized knowledge, art as the expression of that knowledge remains free from the trammels of didacticism. Even so, there is still no reason in the world why personalized knowledge should not be true knowledge.

Nevertheless, the artist who is hired to produce a work of art which expresses at the level of object-centered knowledge something which the artist himself does not personally believe to be true is faced with a special problem. If such an artist is to produce a genuine and integral work of art, he must at the very least find something about the object he portrays which is true and which is apt to yield him a genuine artistic insight; and he must make this truth the thing which the art object expresses. If I may be allowed an extreme example, the atheist who attempts to build a church in honor of the Ascension might, for instance, portray the Ascension as being a symbol of a deep-seated human desire for happiness and ultimate success. This is *a* truth about the Ascension, although it is hardly the whole truth. The chances are that a congregation of believers would read a good deal more into the church than the church actually expresses. Nevertheless, in this way the artist could build his church while still preserving his artistic integrity.

If this whole analysis of the nature of art and its relation to the moral order be correct, then there are two negative judgments that can be leveled against a work of art, one by the artist alone and one by both the artist and his public. The artist alone must judge whether or not the art object correctly expresses his personalized reaction to the world as he conceives it; but both the artist and his public must judge whether or not the world (both physical and moral) as the

artist conceives it is the real world as it actually exists. Provided, however, the personalized nature of artistic knowledge and expression be always kept in mind and safeguarded, at this level of aesthetic judgment, as I hope I have shown, the norms of morality and of aesthetics are identical.

Chronicle

The Association for Realistic Philosophy held its fall meeting on October 24 and 25 at Harvard University. Professor Herman Dooyeweerd (visiting professor at Harvard [Free University, Amsterdam]) gave a paper, "Can Reason be Autonomous?"; the commentator was Professor David Freeman (University of Rhode Island). Professor Geoffrey Clive (Clark University) read a paper, "Existentialist and Phenomenological Elements in the Thought of William James."

The Brandeis University Club of New York has announced a lecture series to be held at the Hunter Playhouse. Among the lectures scheduled are "The Crisis in Higher Education," October 14, with George N. Shuster (president, Hunter College), William C. Fels (president, Bennington College), and Stringfellow Barr; Clarence Q. Berger (Brandeis University) will be chairman; and "The Impact of Science on Our Culture," December 16, with Norman Cousins, William L. Laurence, Leonard K. Nash (Harvard University); John P. Roche (Brandeis University) will be chairman.

Villanova University will inaugurate an annual lecture series in honor of St. Augustine to begin this spring. St. Augustine and the Augustinian tradition is the general theme for the series, which will feature eminent American and European scholars. It is planned to publish the lectures annually. The inaugural lecture will be given by the Reverend Paul Henry, s.j., of the Catholic Institute of Paris, currently visiting professor at Duke University.

George St. Hilaire, S.J.

CULTURAL RELATIVISM AND PRIMITIVE ETHICS

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I

Contact with nearly every preliterate as well as civilized culture in the world has unveiled to anthropologists the vast disparity in mores and general world picture of men around the globe. The Australian aborigine eking out his existence in the most primitive fashion thinks differently, has a different moral code, sanctions different practices and taboos than does the Euroamerican found on Fifth Avenue, New York, or assembling cars in a Detroit automobile factory. Man is man wherever you go, but somehow so many things depend on his environment and cultural milieu that his outlook is more varied than his morphological makeup.

This diversity has given birth to the now widely disseminated theory known as cultural relativity. Melville J. Herskovits, one of its most ardent propounders, gives us its definition in a neat sentence when he says, "This principle, briefly stated, is as follows: *Judgments are based on experience, and experience is interpreted by each individual in terms of his own enculturation.*" [1]

Once he has posited this principle, Herskovits goes on to erect his structure of cultural relativism by stipulating that the morals and ethos of one age are replaced by a new set in another. The normal and the abnormal can be defined only with reference to the specific culture we are viewing. And the greatest enemy of both a proper appreciation and a truly objective judgment of cultures not our own is ethnocentrism.[2]

Another anthropologist pushes the principle to some of its logical conclusions.

> In looking at a polygamous society and a monogamous society, we have no valid way to assert that the one is better than the other. Both systems provide for human needs; each has values discoverable only when we look at marriage from the point of view of the man who lives under the one system or the other. This is, necessarily then, also to be said in comparing cultures which practice torture, infanticide, in-group sorcery, and homosexuality with those that do not.[3]

Simultaneously, however, this rigid extreme of cultural relativism is a cause of concern to the cultural anthropologist. The question arose sharply when he asked himself if he was to tolerate the brutalities of Dachau and the terrors of Communist Russia. He could say that it is not wrong for the Eskimo to sanction infanticide and for the Dahomean to practice polygamy, but he could not bring himself to nod in approval at the inhuman butcheries of Nazi Germany. Perhaps there is some way of judging after all. Could it be that Euroamerican culture has some validity applicable to all mankind?

The drafting of the Bill of Human Rights, a task assigned to a board of anthropologists, helped to delineate this discrepancy in cold relief. If we merely let every clan, every culture, go its way in its present practices precisely because no one has a right to say that there is such a thing as permanency in values or to state what these might be, then we are at a stalemate and human rights have no significance.

The ethnologist, nevertheless, is a serious seeker after truth. And his present dilemma is as embarrassing to him as it is satisfying to his

[1]*Man and His Works* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), p. 63.

[2]Herskovits also stresses the need of complete detachment, which follows, of course, from a purgation of ethnocentrism: "A basic necessity of ethnographic research is the exercise of scientific detachment, which in turn calls for a rigid exclusion of value-judgments" (*ibid.*, p. 80). And A. L. Kroeber is even more insistent on the need of eradicating ethnocentrism and all value judgments: "There is no room in anthropology for a shred of ethnocentricity, of homini-centricity; for prevaluations in favor of our civilization, our religion, our philosophy, our standards; nor room either for reservations of this product or that belief as being too noble or too fine to be studied by ordinary methods of natural science" (*Anthropology* [rev. ed. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1948], p. 841).

[3]Robert Redfield, *The Primitive World and Its Transformations* (Ithaca, Cornell Univ. Press [reissued as a World Seal Book, 1957]), p. 144.

[4]*Ibid.*, p. 163.

[5]*Ibid.*, p. 157.

[6]"Universal Categories of Culture," *Anthropology Today*, ed. Kroeber and others (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 521.

[7]*Ibid.*, p. 520.

triumphant adversary. Robert Redfield feels that there is a maturity and growth in the universal value system.

> The standards as to the good have changed with history. The moral canon tends to mature. The change is far from steady, and the future course of the ethical judgment is not, it seems to me, assured to us. But in this sense—that on the whole the human race has come to develop a more decent and humane measure of goodness—there has been a transformation of ethical judgment which makes us look at noncivilized peoples, not as equals, but as people on a different level of human experience.[4]

Redfield calls this an extension of the doctrine of cultural relativism and he states this in the following formula: The true and the good "are relative to a great historic cultural difference, that between uncivilized people and civilized people."[5] And so we are again faced with the problem of the one and the many.

The difficulty arises, of course, in deciding precisely what is relative and what permanent. For although Redfield has not employed the term "permanent," he has implied it when he speaks of development and maturity. If all is relative, then how can we judge what is "more decent and humane"? Whether he realizes it or not, Redfield is doing far more than merely extending the theory of cultural relativism; he is transforming it.

Many anthropologists are now aware that the similarities in man far outweigh the variations. Clyde Kluckhohn has pointed out that man's social life postulates a certain amount of reciprocal behavior, a standard system of communication, and mutually accepted morals.[6] But with a cultural relativism as a *point de départ*, anthropologists find it difficult to establish what these invariants are. They somehow realize, nevertheless, that they underly this relativism. "In principle, however," Kluckhohn unabashedly acclaims, "there is a generalized framework that underlies the more apparent and striking facts of cultural relativity."[7]

Kroeber, in 1953, had also reached the conclusion that a rigid cultural relativism leaves many a *lacuna* in the ethical outlook. But he too is in a quandary as to the degree of variation and permanence which obtains in the value system. "It is a fundamentally scientific

question which will not be answered soon and will not be answered in terms of zero or a hundred per cent."[8] The question demands reformulation and will take much time and painstaking effort.

II

The problem is before us. Where lies its solution? Has anthropology with its truly global experience of man solved a problem of which philosophy has for centuries not even been cognizant? The contemporary ethnologist has rejected the concept of "human nature" as one of his greatest and most long-standing hindrances to a really open view of man.[9] It was only the obliteration of such a preconceived notion from his mind that purged the cultural anthropologist, which in turn rendered him tolerant and understanding of all cultures, no matter how primitive or how apparently aberrant. Philosophy, with its stress on natures, is obviously aprioristic and therefore wrong.

Yet the relativistic pragmatism of the anthropologist, as we have seen, causes him concern in certain realms and has stood in need of revision and recasting in a new light. Redfield states that there must be some universals of morality "because universal conditions of human living give rise to them."[10] Here we have arrived at a need, an exigency. And this need is seen as something so basic that it becomes universalized not merely in atomized cultures but in all parts of our inhabited planet.

David Bidney, a philosopher-anthropologist, seeks a way between the two horns by attempting to demonstrate that we are actually not faced with a dilemma.

[8]A. L. Kroeber, "Concluding Review," *An Appraisal of Anthropology Today*, ed. Sol Tax and others (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 376.

[9]"It has been this use of cross-cultural materials, more than anything else, that has sounded the death-knell of theories about 'human nature.' 'Human nature' was that chameleon-like force in man that was variously held to cause him to seek profits, or to be a monogamist or to have polygamist tendencies, or to strive to better his standard of living or to do any of those things that seemed obviously basic to students of Euroamerican society. . . . It can, indeed, be said that the philosophy of cultural relativism, that has come to dominate most anthropological thought and, indeed, social science in general, has its beginnings in the refutations of 'human nature' that mark the literature of cultural anthropology" (Herskovits, *Man and His Works*, pp. 617-18).

[10]*The Primitive World*, p. 142.

[11]"The Concept of Value in Modern Anthropology," *Anthropology Today*, p. 692.

[12]*Ibid.*

> The issue as interpreted by the cultural relativists apparently turns on two alternatives: either one accepts a doctrine of fixed absolute values, or else one denies objective norms in favor of historic relativity and relative validity of values. I do not think, however, that we are necessarily limited to these two alternatives.[11]

He then goes on to say that because there are growth and development in the field of their disciplines, natural scientists do not thereby deny the existence of an objective criterion of truth with regard to their matter. Growth and development do not imply substantial change; this mutation is on the accidental level. Therefore with regard to moral values the same thing holds good.

> Similarly, in the sphere of moral truth values, it is not logical to reject objective moral norms simply because some alleged objective moral norms are seen to have a purely subjective validity within a given cultural context. . . . There is no reason why there may not be a cumulative increment in our knowledge and achievement of moral ideals comparable to our advance in the attainment of truth values in the natural sciences. Murder and theft are examples of negative moral values which are, even now, concrete ethnological universals, even though there is considerable disparity as regards the areas of their application in different cultures.[12]

Here we feel that Bidney is coming to grips with the problem, not running away from it. He has made a comparison, showing the absurdity of the extreme cultural relativistic position by pointing up a like position with reference to the natural sciences. No one will deny that these sciences have advanced so far in the past three or four hundred years as to make our forefathers look absolutely naive in some of their most basic tenets. Yet the natural scientists do not throw up their hands in despair and deny the objectivity of their several sciences. Change, growth, development, mean advance in the same materials, just as a person in his lifetime grows and develops from a tiny, nonreasoning creature to a rational, intellectual man. Basically, Bidney is facing the problem of the one and the many.

If we view man from the evolutionary point of view—not now from the standpoint of physical but rather intellectual evolution—we realize that reflective consciousness of moral values must dawn on him after the trial and error of aeons of generations. *Homo paleojavanicus* and *homo neanderthalensis* could not be expected to know what modern man knows. The ethical dawn is necessarily long in coming; and even in our own day, as Redfield has pointed out, there are varying degrees of ethical consciousness throughout the world.

History must develop man's capacity for reason. But because this development takes so long, it cannot be hoped to be attained within the lifetime of the individual. Complete rationality, then, is reached by man only after hundreds of thousands of years. But, "mankind has the potentiality for developing rationality to its fullest extent, and rationality is therefore a universally valid idea." [13]

"Rationality" is the one ideal of the many millions of men who "have trod, have trod, have trod." And its dynamic force carries man to its development within him. Even though each individual man has not reached it and many more will not, it is nevertheless for man, for each individual man; and the day will dawn when all enjoy its fruits —fruits which have been fought for by so many millions through so many ages.

Rationality brings with it, of course, the ethical dawn, the growth and development of moral consciousness. For rationality bespeaks intellect, and intellect precedes will in pointing out its own object, which is *verum*. The will, following upon intellect, grasps the *verum* as *bonum*, something to be sought after. And as St. Thomas points out, "the good is the first thing that dawns on the apprehension of practical reason, which is ordained to action; for every agent acts for an end, which has the intelligibility of good." [14]

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] "Sicut ens est quod cadit in apprehensione simpliciter, ita bonum est primum quod cadit in apprehensione practicae rationis, quae ordinatur ad opus; omne enim agens agit propter finem, qui habet rationem boni" (*ST*, I-II, q. 94, a. 2).

[15] "Et ideo primum principium in ratione practica est quod fundatur supra rationem boni, quae est: Bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Hoc est ergo primum praeceptum legis, quod bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum. Et super hoc fundantur omnia alia praecepta legis naturae, ut scilicet omnia illa facienda vel vitanda pertineant ad praecepta legis naturae, quae ratio practica naturaliter apprehendit esse bona humana" (*ibid.*).

III

In this same article St. Thomas solves for us, basically, the problem of cultural relativity. And it is surprising how much latitude he allows with regard to the many value systems throughout the world. The title of the article is *Utrum Lex Naturalis Contineat Plura Praecepta vel Unum Tantum.* And the Angelic Doctor responds by stating that just as there are many primary indemonstrable principles, so there are many precepts of the natural law.

> . . . the first principle in practical reason is that founded on the concept of good, which is that the good is what all things seek after. This is, therefore, the first precept of law, that good is to be done and sought after, and evil to be avoided. And upon this are based all the other precepts of the natural law; that is, all those things to be done or to be avoided, which practical reason naturally apprehends as human goods, pertain to the precepts of the law of nature.[15]

So far the disseminators of cultural relativism would be in wholehearted agreement with us. The good is to be done and the evil avoided. But the *crux* of the problem arises when we ask—for *all* men—what is the good and what the evil? For some men infanticide is good, for others, polyandry, for still others both these are bad and something else is good. Thus we are brought back to our starting point and the original problem still exists. As a consequence, the only rational solution is cultural relativity.

St. Thomas, however, does not stop here. Admittedly, he has so far left himself open, for he has been very general; but he must lay these foundation stones to demonstrate that *de facto* all men are seeking what is good and avoiding what is bad. Obviously, if we are to proceed farther, we must start with a norm of morality, which according to St. Thomas is *recta ratio.* Men always seek to justify their actions, seeking *reasons* for what they do; they will often *rationalize* to the point of justifying the most heinous crimes. If, then, we rectify our reason, that on which we base our moral judgments will be in accord with nature and consequently will be good and proper.

Accordingly, Aquinas continues by pointing out that *bonum* has an aura of an end about it and *malum* the opposite. Therefore reason grasps as good whatever man inclines toward by nature, and vice versa for evil.[16] If reason is not distorted but *recta*, in accordance with its very nature, then what it gets as end (and consequently as good) is that towards which natural appetite tends. This harmony between nature and reason will secure for man the proper *bona* and the proper *mala*. And since all men have the same nature (they are all rational animals, or as anthropologists like to say, they are all culture builders, which reflects their rationality), if they follow this nature, their normative judgments should be substantially in universal agreement with each other.

There is, however, still a large tract of no-man's-land wherein differences abound; but these differences will not be substantial, only accidental. Furthermore, as we have already pointed out, we must leave room in this no-man's-land for rational development, growth in moral consciousness.

St. Thomas continues:

> Therefore according to the order of natural inclinations there is an order of the precepts of the natural law. For first of all there is in man an inclination to good according to nature in which he communicates with all substances; namely, that every substance seeks after the conservation of its *esse* according to its nature. And in accordance with this inclination those things pertain to the natural law through which man's life is preserved and the contrary is hindered.[17]

[16] "Quia vero bonum habet rationem finis, malum autem rationem contrarii, inde est quod omnia illa ad quae homo habet naturalem inclinationem, ratio naturaliter apprehendit ut bona, et per consequens ut opere prosequenda, et contraria eorum ut mala et vitanda" (*ibid.*).

[17] "Secundum igitur ordinem inclinationum naturalium est ordo praeceptorum legis naturae. Inest enim primo inclinatio homini ad bonum secundum naturam in qua communicat cum omnibus substantiis, prout scilicet quaelibet substantia appetit conservationem sui esse secundum suam naturam. Et secundum hanc inclinationem pertinent ad legem naturalem ea per quae vita hominis conservatur, et contrarium impeditur" (*ibid.*).

[18] "Secundo inest homini inclinatio ad aliqua magis specialia, secundum naturam in qua communicat cum ceteris animalibus. Et secundum hoc dicuntur ea esse de lege naturali quae natura omnia animalia docuit, ut est commixtio maris et feminae, et educatio liberorum, et similia" (*ibid.*).

The first precept has been laid down. All things—no matter what their nature—have a radical desire to preserve their existence. Once created, once joined with a substantial form, they violently resist decomposition and corruption of their *esse*. In the case of living things, this desire to preserve existence is manifested in the desire to preserve life. Man's first concern is his *esse*; and since he knows that his life means his *esse*, he is by nature constantly on the alert against all forces opposing his life.

The second primary principle of the natural law is equally universal to man.

> Secondly, there is in man an inclination to something more special, according to that nature in which he communicates with the rest of animals. And in accordance with this, those things are said to be of the natural law which nature has taught all animals, as is the sexual intercourse between male and female, and the education of children, and so forth.[18]

The conservation of the species is naturally and intuitively known and desired by all man. This is so basic that no reasoning, no education or even civilization, is needed to point it out. The most primitive of all men in history did not have anyone to inform them that their species had to be preserved by sexual union; yet they obviously had the desire and the knowledge, or their species would have become extinct.

Education of children is the second basic *notum* which St. Thomas enumerates under this class of first principles. And, of course, this education must be *humano modo*. It does not mean formal schooling, as is obvious; but it does imply a bringing up, an orientation in accordance with each culture's patterns, value system, religious beliefs, juridical law, customs, and world view. In short, it implies complete enculturation. This, too, is immediately given in every man's experience. There is a natural tendency to make real men out of the offspring. And for each tribe, whether civilized or not, real men, real human beings, are themselves.

Interesting to note at this juncture is the fact that education is considered by ethnologists as one of the universals of culture. Here,

then, we have an identity between this pattern and that of the value system.

Finally, we arrive at that precept which is *homini proprium.* It pertains solely to intellect, to reason.

> Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to the good according to the nature of reason, which is proper to him; namely, man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God and to live in society. And in accordance with this, those things belong to the natural law which pertain to an inclination of this kind, such as that man avoids ignorance, does not offend others with whom he must transact business, and other like things which pertain to this.[19]

There are really two principles contained in this last one. Man avoids ignorance, and he lives in peace with his fellow man. These are specifically human; they are nonexistent among the animals, for only man can know and thus learn to live at peace with others.

All men, from the preliterate Eskimo and Australian to the most highly educated Euroamerican, are industrious avoiders of ignorance. They wish to know everything, if possible, about their own culture and many things of other cultures besides. This curiosity begins in early childhood and carries through till death. We shun ignorance; it is a plague. And the desire for knowledge, as St. Thomas tells us, does not cease with human things. Even the earliest men, as is evidenced by the elaborate burial rites Neanderthal man performed for his dead, strove to pierce through the here and now of the contingent world to eternity and the absolute.

The avoidance of ignorance, as listed under this third precept of the natural law, should not be confused with the education of children, which was found under the second precept. The latter, strictly

[19]"Tertio modo inest homini inclinatio ad bonum secundum naturam rationis, quae est sibi propria; sicut homo habet naturalem inclinationem ad hoc quod veritatem cognoscat de Deo, et ad hoc quod in societate vivat. Et secundum hoc, ad legem naturalem pertinent ea quae ad huiusmodi inclinationem spectant, utpote quod homo ignorantiam vitet, quod alios non offendat cum quibus debet conversari, et cetera huiusmodi quae ad hoc spectant" (*ibid.*).

[20]Clifford G. Kossel, S.J., in a paper entitled "Some Problems of Truth in Ethics" (unpublished) has brought out the all-inclusiveness of these three basic moral principles of practical reason: "There is no moral precept which is not a determination of one of these essential goods; they contain in principle the totality of the human good."

speaking, is bringing up and is, therefore, common to men and animals alike; the former is that aspect which so amazes anthropologists about man that they use it as the specific difference between him and his simian cousins. Unlike the ape or any other animal, man builds upon the past; he learns and discovers *new things;* he is a culture builder and an *animal symbolicum.*

To live in society is not only natural to man but an exigency. Man abhors solitude; further, he is dependent on his parents till about his eighteenth year. Finally, speech itself, whose very *raison d'être* is communication, seems to point up, as Aristotle says, the need of a social life. In order to live in society, man had to learn to live peaceably with his neighbor, first with the members of his own sib and then, as societies expanded, with other tribes and clans until whole states were eventually formed.

What makes all these first precepts pertain to the natural law is the fact that they are all seen as the good to be followed and to be done. And, as we saw St. Thomas point out earlier in this article, this is the very first general principle of practical reason. After the will tends towards these precepts, the intellect, in its turn, then sees them as man's good, consequently that they are a law, a law of nature itself —for him.[20]

IV

The cultural relativists will interpose at this juncture by stating that they are still in general agreement with us, but that we have not said a word about homosexuality, polygyny, theft, infanticide, murder, or suicide. And then there are a host of smaller values which are as varied as the cultures that sanction them. What of all these?

Again, however, St. Thomas proceeds further. In the final three articles of this same question he asks first whether the natural law is one among all men; second, whether it can be changed; and finally whether its imprint can be eradicated from the heart of man.

In the first (the fourth article) he says that since practical reason deals with contingencies and the operations of men, the more we get down to particularities, the wider the divergence in beliefs and practices.

> In matters of action, however, there is not the same truth or practical rectitude among all men with reference to the more particular, but only with reference to the common things; and among those for whom there is the same rectitude in particulars, it is not equally known to all. Thus, therefore, it is clear that concerning the common principles of reason whether speculative or practical, there is the same truth or rectitude among all men, and it is equally known. . . . But concerning the particular conclusions of practical reason there is neither the same truth nor rectitude among all; and even among those for whom it is the same it is not equally known.[21]

Here we see Aquinas's latitude—a latitude which embraces all value systems the world over. Those common principles which he enumerated in the second article are the same among all men both as regards their rectitude and their knowledge. As he will point out in the sixth article, man cannot erase them from his heart, no matter how obfuscated his mind becomes by vice and perverted moral habits. The rectitude, therefore, is always and everywhere the same. Likewise all men know these precepts intuitively. But as we descend to particulars, problems begin to arise. Concerning those precepts "which are, as it were, conclusions of the common principles, [the natural law] is the same among all in most cases both according to rectitude and according to knowledge . . ."[22] But, St. Thomas adds, in some cases these secondary precepts can vary as regards rectitude, on account of certain impediments, and as regards knowledge, on account of passion, bad mores, or evil habits of nature.

[21]"In operativis autem non est eadem veritas vel rectitudo practica apud omnes quantum ad propria, sed solum quantum ad communia; et apud illos apud quos est eadem rectitudo in propriis, non est aequaliter omnibus nota. Sic igitur patet quod quantum ad communia principia rationis sive speculativae sive practicae, est eadem veritas seu rectitudo apud omnes, et aequaliter nota. . . . Sed quantum ad proprias conclusiones rationis practicae, nec est eadem veritas seu rectitudo apud omnes; nec etiam apud quos est eadem, est aequaliter nota" (*ST*, I-II, q. 94, a. 4).

[22]"Sed quantum ad quaedam propria, quae sunt quasi conclusiones principiorum communium, est eadem apud omnes ut in pluribus et secundum rectitudinem et secundum notitiam . . ." (*ibid.*).

[23] Latrocinia nullam habent infamiam quae extra fines cuiusque civitatis fiunt, atque ea iuventutis exercendae ac desidiae minuendae causa fieri praedicant" (vi, 23).

[24]*ST*, I-II, q. 94, a. 4.

[25]*Ibid.*, q. 100, aa. 1, 3, and 11.

[26]*Ibid.*, a. 11.

Really, then, cultural relativism contains more than just a modicum of validity. Aquinas's explanation allows such a wide margin of difference as to be truly amazing. Basically, it arises out of his keen knowledge of human nature and his consequent lack of all ethnocentrism. For his principles, set down centuries before many of the tribes anthropology is studying today were even known, are as applicable to today's scientific and advanced world as they were in his own society. In the fifth article of this question he even says that the natural law can be changed through addition, which is precisely what Bidney is stating today. Things can be added *ad humanam vitam utilia* as man becomes morally conscious in history.

An example of ignorance of the more particular aspects of these precepts is the sanction on theft of the ancient Germans, which Caesar recounts in his *De Bello Gallico*.[23] The reason for this ignorance, Aquinas says,[24] is that the Germans had bad customs and moral habits. Or again, certain primitive tribes may see the common precept to live in peace with their fellow men as something which applies to their own clan exclusively. They may be waging a chronic war with their neighbors across the river or over the hills and will kill these latter at every opportunity. But the dawn of moral consciousness is just beginning in them; they are still immature children as regards ethical judgment. The fact that they live at peace among themselves is already a demonstration of this precept's validity, and the time will come when their peaceful relations will expand to embrace the traditional enemy across the river too.

Later in the *Prima Secundae*[25] St. Thomas goes into detail about the secondary and tertiary precepts, which. he says, are offshoots of the primary principles. The *communissima* (or primary precepts) need no promulgation or explication, since they are immediately clear to all; the secondary, or *magis determinata*, which are the precepts of the Decalogue, do require to be pointed out, "because in a few cases human judgment happens to be perverted concerning these."[26] Finally, there are those precepts which are manifest to the wise alone; and these are the more refined laws revealed to Moses and Aaron, which we find in Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy.

V

The natural law, then, in its first principles is one and immutable among all men both as regards rectitude and cognition.[27] But in particular conclusions there is a latitude among some in both rectitude and cognition. These *particularia* are arrived at after a certain amount of consideration, reasoning, ethical maturity. We now know that any practices in certain cultures which are against the *communissima* or primary precepts of the natural law are definitely a perversion of nature; all men should know them. This perversion, however, is had in varying degrees. Also, the knowledge may not be entirely universalized among some very primitive peoples.

What must be borne constantly in mind is the fact of man's growth in moral consciousness. Ethnologists are beginning to recognize this fact as well as the existence of certain ethical universals. If there is such a thing as development, perfecting of the human species in the moral sphere, then we need not fear, as Herskovits does, to treat some peoples as ethically lower than others. By this we do not mean to condone everything our own Euroamerican code sanctions. We take as our *point de départ* what St. Thomas lays down as primary

[27]"Since it [the natural law] is a part of his [man's] nature, it comes from the Author of his nature, namely from God. It is not the result of a process of reasoning; rather it is an initiative awareness of moral obligation. It is something written upon the tablet of his conscience by his Creator. Because it is a principle of human nature, it governs all men at all places and at all times and is essentially immutable. It applies to man both in his private and his social conduct. In respect of his social conduct, its first principle is, *seek the common good*, or, the same thing analytically expressed, *do good to others, harm no one and render to each his own*" (Harold R. McKinnon, "The Higher Law: Prevailing Teaching Denies Moral Law" [unpublished address delivered before the Conference of Federal Judges of the Ninth Circuit, San Francisco, Sept. 3, 1946, p. 5]).

[28]Paul Radin, *Primitive Man as Philosopher* (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1927), p. 96. Take special note of the last sentence.

[29]*Ibid.*, p. 65.

[30]Wilhelm Koppers, *Primitive Man and His World Picture*, trans. Edith Raybould (London: Sheed & Ward, 1952), p. 55. (Italics added.) Koppers claims that this is the common opinion among specialists on this question. Herskovits, on the contrary (*Man and His Works*, p. 116), says that we do not know, nor have we any means of finding out, whether early man lived promiscuously or not.

[31]"It is the spirits who, long ago, established the social and moral regulations which govern Yap life, who originally forbade incest, and who take action against it when it occurs. The spirits are therefore seen as the source of morality and the locus of ultimate authority" (David M. Schneider, "Political Organization, Supernatural Sanction and Punishment for Incest on Yap," *American Anthropologist*, LIX [1957], 797).

in the natural law, and we erect our ethical edifice upon that. These precepts, together with *recta ratio*, our norm of morality, are the immutable fundament according to which we can judge all cases around the globe.

VI

Despite the allowances made for precivilized tribes, however, ethnologists inform us that the most primitive peoples have a very high code of morals.

> The ethics of primitives shows us a very high code—one that inculcates man's right to happiness and freedom of expression. a limitation on this freedom because of human relationships, and the individual's full responsibility for his actions. And though this code is not always lived up to, the primitive is aware of this as something wrong.[28]

Among the moral beliefs of the Winnebago Indians, this same author informs us, are the uselessness of killing and the fitness of marrying only one person at a time.[29] And another ethnologist goes so far as to state that "primitive promiscuity or group marriage must be rejected and a normal *monogamous* family life substituted for the earliest stage of man's history."[30] This is supported by the mythology of the primitives, who claim that they received their laws on sex taboos from their high god. The natives on the island of Yap believe that they received their moral code from the spirits, who are regarded as the source of morality.[31]

These facts, if not actually pointing to a divine institution of the moral code, at least indicate its sacrosanct and sublime character in the minds of the most primitive peoples. They recognize morality as their most precious possession and therefore guard it with this intangible aura of sacredness.

Among pre-Stone Age primitives—the Bushmen, Pygmies, Australians, and Eskimos—morality for the most part is surprisingly high. And it is thought by some that it is only contact with civilizations which are higher technologically that has broken down this high state

in some places.[32] Often, there exists premarital chastity, freedom of choice of a marriage partner, fidelity in *monogamous* marriage, equality of sexes, marital chastity, and great love and care of children.[33]

These are far more than the most basic precepts of the natural law. Monogamous marriage was not even the rule in the Mosaic code. Since all men are endowed with an intellect and reasoning power, they can arrive at the more particular principles of the natural law after moral development and mature reflection. Their will, a *rational* appetite, seeks after the good which intellect has laid bare to it.

VII

Cultural relativism in its extreme from, then, is untenable. For, as many cultural anthropologists are beginning to admit today, there do exist certain ethical universals. St. Thomas tells us what they are and how far they apply. He leaves us a large tract of no-man's-land where rectitude and knowledge are not sufficient to point out to certain peoples what is right and what wrong. In the same breath he is leaving the field open for the development of moral consciousness.

Is homosexuality wrong? Is infanticide wrong? Are the practice of torture and in-group sorcery wrong? Some cultures sanction these practices. If we say they are wrong, are we ethnocentric? Are we classifying them as inferior? Should we take steps to correct them?

What does right reason tell us in the light of the primary precepts of the natural law? Does homosexuality conserve the species? Does infanticide? The answer to these is definitely no. They are perversions of nature, and it is only because they are not seen as part of the imperative to preserve the species that their practice continues; or else their evil is known and recognized, and they bring with them unhappiness and frustration.

What about torture and sorcery? It is immediately evident that these involve further refinements of the *principia communissima.* If there is a lack of cognition here, it is not blameworthy. But in each of these groups of practices we recognize a distortion of the natural

[32]Anthony Zimmerman, S.V.D., "Sexual Morality among Primitives," *Christian Family*, LII (Nov., 1957), 6-9, 31-32.

[33]*Ibid.*, p. 31.

law—if not in its primary, at least in its secondary and tertiary precepts. And since we are further developed, we are not being ethnocentric if we admit the moral inferiority of those who practice them, any more than an Einstein would be if he pointed out to a Toda of India how to use a milking machine for his buffaloes, or to a Ponapean of Micronesia how to put commercial fertilizer on his yams.

And so we see the one and the many and how they can exist side by side. There is great latitude (multitude) within an immutability (one). All men of all times know in the immediacy of human experience an unchangeable, irreducible natural law. But men are as varied as the places they inhabit. As they develop, however, and as their reasons become more rectified and their knowledge grows, the *particularia* of the natural law dawn on their consciences, and the many approach ever near to the one.

"Being" in *The Sophist*

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I. Dr. Eslick's Thesis

Dr. Leonard J. Eslick has expounded, in two articles,[1] a profound theory of Plato's later metaphysics. Though this theory draws on Cornford's reading of the *Parmenides* and on statements in the other late dialogues, its crucial test is *The Sophist;* and both articles center attention on the meaning of "being" and "other" in this dialogue. Though the arguments are telescoped in such brief articles, they are complete on this central issue and can be summarized as follows.

Being is, for Plato, a univocal term. To escape the Parmenidean difficulties inherent in this stand, he postulates a dialectic between being and nonbeing. Thus nonbeing *is.* Plato escapes the obvious difficulties of this position by contending that the root of the real is Unity, the One, not existence as a separate principle. To be is to be *this.* Essence not only determines, but is the source of, all truth and reality. Inseity, identity, and unity are the notes of the most Real. For the Forms to exist in time, however, is to become combined with predicates, to have unity mixed, diffused, and diminished by otherness, which makes a thing less real.

Dr. Eslick, therefore, opposes "otherness" to being, and finds here his "existent nonbeing." "The other *exists,* for Plato, and this is precisely the existence of non-being."[2] But it is obvious, in his discussion and in Plato's, that what this otherness dilutes is not *being* as it is used in *The Sophist* but unity. After demonstrating that Plato's supreme principle is *unity* and not being, Dr. Eslick seems nevertheless to work on the Thomistic assumption that whatever opposes the supreme principle of reality must also be the opposite of being. He does not see the audacity of Plato's conception in this work—which places being among the forces that oppose reality, its turmoil and dynamism warring with the stable simplicity of the Forms.

Thus Plato must be, in Dr. Eslick's theory, a skeptic who, in believing that predication means combination with the subject's "other" (and so with *nonbeing*)—thus destroying Form, whose essential note is unity—must believe that we disguise and deny a thing's true essence by trying to know it in the predicate.

The ultimate subject of Platonic predication is non-being, rather than substance or *ousia*.[3]

In discourse, we only know the masks worn by non-being. It is other than any masks which it wears, and in itself it is not like the mask at all, and not more like any mask than another. . . . I believe that the sophist Plato thought he had caught was discourse itself, which, if Plato's theory is correct, is the great dissembler.[4]

II. An Alternate Thesis

To understand *The Sophist*, we must first grasp its teaching that "other" is not opposed to being but to the One and thus to unity, the root of reality (of the noble and the good) but not of existence. If we may put it so, it is comparatively unimportant to Plato whether a thing *exists* in time and space and in combination with other forms. What matters more is that existence must draw its sustenance from pure sources, the same springs from which we draw our knowledge and statements draw their meaning. These are the Forms. As he puts it in the *Timaeus*,

> we must conceive of three things—the becoming actual, that wherein it becomes actual, and *the source wherefrom* the becoming thing is copied and produced. Moreover, the recipient should be likened to the Mother, the source to the Father, and what is engendered between these to the Offspring.[5]

Being is, as Plato says in *The Sophist*, the sum of things. But he is interested in the source of things—of their selfhood and intelligibility, their oneness and identity. He did not, therefore, think in the metaphysical framework of Aquinas, testing diverse real things before him, basing his method on perceptual contact with existent things. He tested reality,

[1]"The Dyadic Character of Being in Plato," The Modern Schoolman, xxxi (Nov., 1953), 11-18. "Plato's Dialectic of Non-Being," *New Scholasticism*, xxix (Jan., 1955), 33-49.

[2]"Dyadic Character of Being in Plato," p. 17.

[3]*Ibid.* The logical positivists reach Dr. Eslick's conclusions about Plato by a different path, as R. C. Cross demonstrates in "Logos and Forms in Plato" (*Mind*, lxiii [Oct., 1954]). Here predication is seen as a shuffling of different masks over the unknown because the Form is merely *the account given of a word in the predicate*. As in Dr. Eslick's thesis, the real Simplicity which Plato sought is unattainable. Predication is complication and therefore self-defeating as a knowledge-process. The very form of our typical means of knowing shows that we cannot look on Beauty bare. It is an exercise in logic, combining and contrasting (by knowing the "other") meaningless counters.

[4]"Plato's Dialectic of Non-Being," p. 49.

[5]*Timaeus* 50C-D.

[6]*Sophist* 248-249A.

[7]*Ibid.*, 249B.

[8]*Ibid.*, 249C.

[9]*Ibid.*, 250C.

rather, by its essential purity, its ability to be named and treated as intelligible. This dialogue, for instance, begins with the problem of error in *discourse* and is an attempt to save the logical structure of predication. Thus aim and method differ from the existentialist approach that Dr. Eslick takes; the aim is to discover the roots of oneness and truth, and the method is logical. He sought not "first act" but final rest in the stability and permanency of the Real.

This is not, of course, to say that Plato was a naive idealist unaware of the problems involved in the concept of separate and stable Forms. In fact, his late dialogues all treat the conflict between his early theory of the Forms and the actual mixture and combination of Forms which is discourse and the world. Thus, in this dialogue, he refutes the "friends of the Forms" by saying that action and passion are no less a part of knowledge than of generation and that if knowledge is of the Forms, then they must act on the mind and be acted upon by it. There must be change even in the pure world of the intellect[6]—but it is a change made possible not by virtue of the Forms themselves, which are by nature stable.[7] This is to say that though the Forms are in themselves the sources of all reality, intelligibility, and excellence, they are not of themselves active or dynamic. Change, action, and passion *exist*, though their nature is repugnant to that of the Forms.

> Then it is apparent that the philosopher, who is especially compelled to credit these things [reason and intelligibility], must reject the view of those who claim that the universe—whether it is One or composed of Many Forms—is entirely stable; yet neither can he heed those who say that being is nothing but ceaseless change.[8]

Plato has disclaimed, then, not only Heraclitus but—finally and clearly—Parmenides. Nor has he been forced to surrender the Forms. He has merely said that *of themselves* they do not have actual existence. To exist they must undergo a kind of degradation. Existence is, then, a less noble and real thing than essence and Form. It is neither rest nor motion, but a "third thing";[9] and the ability of Forms, by virtue of this third and lowlier thing, to combine with each other brings about their entrance into the world of existent things.

> I contend that whatever has the power either to change other things, whatever their nature, or to be affected in any way by another, however base that other agent, and though this be the only time it

suffers change—that thing, I say, exists. For I set up as a true definition (τιθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον ὁρίζειν) that being is nothing but a certain power.[10]

Now, being is not, and cannot be, a Form, since it is the power to *change*, and the essential note of the Forms—as Dr. Eslick demonstrates beyond doubt—is stability. This shows how far Plato is from considering "being" an unmixed excellence. He has repudiated the metaphysics of *The Republic*, in which he claimed that material things had no true existence but were the fantasies of blinded men. To renounce that view, he inserted in the passage just quoted the phrase "however *base* that other agent" (φαυλοτάτου). Now he admits that material things—though they remain base in his consideration—must be said to exist. Faced with the same problem which Thomists answer with the doctrine of the analogy of being, Plato felt no necessity for keeping existence among the nobler things in his hierarchy of values. He continued to use it as a univocal term; but he could do so only by calling it a protean and extra-Formal reality—a "power" or function of the Forms in their combined state and that by which and in which they are able to combine.

If we are to understand what kind of nature this "third thing" has for Plato, we must follow him further in his logical method. The proof that Forms are made to exist by their combination in the actual world of time and space is a step forward in his analysis of predication, which he now defines as the combination of words in speech. Dialectic is the art of combining things in discourse to correspond exactly with the combination of Forms in fact. A brief investigation of these "combinings" leads Plato to say that if he has discovered three things necessary to them—rest,

[10]*Ibid.*, 247E.

[11]Dr. Eslick is not, therefore, justified in his departure from Fowler's translation (which he quotes unchanged in most places) of 255E. He alters "classes" to "Forms" as a rendering of the protean γένος, though it obviously refers to these five γένη collectively.

[12]Dr. Eslick denies this of "being," saying that "if there are no absolute self-existents, no being which has being unto itself, then being must be altogether abolished" ("Dyadic Character of Being in Plato," p. 17). Here again a foreign emphasis on being as the *most real* Reality has been imported into the context of this dialogue. Recast to fit that context, his statement should read: the preservation of discourse demands that there be absolutely self-meaningful terms, which have one meaning unto themselves, lest meaning be abolished in discourse. But if there are self-meaningful terms at the source of our knowing process, there must be self-enclosed Forms at the source of Reality. As the dialogue makes clear, *existence* is another (and less important) matter—not a Form; univocal, as Dr. Eslick points out, yet applied also to material things and so not possessed "unto itself" by any Form; a "power," or δύναμις in the definition which Dr. Eslick quotes in both articles.

[13]"Dyadic Character of Being in Plato," p. 17.

[14]255C-E.

motion, and being—he must also be granted a fourth and a fifth. For in every combination there is an *assimilation* of things with different *identities*. Thus sameness and difference ("the other") must join the three categories already mentioned.

These five categories or classes (γένη) are, therefore, the five things Plato thinks necessary to preserve the possibility of discourse—that is, of the combination of Forms. *Therefore* they exist, since the fact of discourse is as fundamental to him as the perception of outside realities is to the Thomist.

What, precisely, *are* the five things listed? First, since they are the elements which make the combination and changing of Forms possible—explaining what cannot be explained solely in terms of the Forms, as Socrates protested in the *Parmenides*—they are not themselves Forms.[11] Furthermore, they are all five present in every existent thing, every combination of Forms. And, since they are not Forms themselves, no one of them has a separate and unmixed reality. The five things are functions of the Forms in their combined state—omnipresent but always *in alio*.[12] Dr. Fslick makes much of this fact as applied to "other," as if it were a distinction all its own among the five.

> There is some evidence that the question of whether it is strictly proper to refer to the other as a Form at all was hotly debated in the Academy in Plato's lifetime. For the Forms, as true beings, must have the dyadic character of existing both in themselves and in relation, whereas the other is distinct from all beings precisely in the fact that it is quite literally nothing in itself. It has no essence of its own.[13]

But none of the five are fully *true* (that is, stable) beings. Truth, along with the intelligibilities of which it is constructed, can be permanent as meaning only in the Forms, not in these media of change. These media, including "being" itself, exist only in relation—that is, *within* the Form-combinations—and have no pure essences of their own. They are, like "prime matter" to the Thomist, *principles* of reality, not themselves real things. Thus there is no reason to contrast "other" with "being" in this respect.

The five "classes" of this dialogue are not Forms. Two pairs of them are relative and functions of each other: motion and rest, other and same. They are defined by Plato so as to differentiate them from the "fundaments" of each relation, Eternity and the One.[14] The fifth thing in the list is

linked with them in their omnipresent and impure kind of reality, being. We are not used to thinking of "being" in such company and on such a level. Yet that is where and what it is in this work. These five types of "thing"—Plato can get no more specific than that—are necessary to constitute the charged atmosphere in which Forms combine and act and *are*. Despite their mysterious quality, Plato is compelled to accept them because of the unimpeachable demands of discourse. Realizing this, A. L. Peck calls these γένη 'pseudo-Forms" in his articles on the *Parmenides*.[15] And in his treatment of *The Sophist*[16] he maintains that just as nonbeing, so called, is merely not-*this*, so all the other γένη are mere functions of higher realities.

> There is thus no true γένος 'θάτερον', but only "parts" or "pieces" of θάτερον — θάτερον than X, Y, Z. . . . The three γένη which "permeate" all the other, *viz.*, ταὐτόν, θάτερον (τὸ μὴ ὄν), and τὸ ὄν, are defective in structure, and must be completed into ταὐτόν πρός ἑαυτό, θάτερον πρός τι (τὸ μὴ ὄν X), and τὸ ὄν X.[17]

But Peck supposes that, in order to argue from the sophists' own terms, Plato uses the γένη as poor and partial phrases describing the Forms from one aspect and in incomplete statement. The whole dialogue, however, shows that these dynamisms must exist in all Forms and be no single Form. The γένη are not concessions to one viewpoint but necessary parts of his later theory of the Forms. From this it can be seen that "the other" is not the reverse and negation of "being" in this dialogue. Rather,

[15]See the *Classical Quarterly*, Vol. XLVII, No. 3; Vol. XLVIII, No. 1.

[16]"Plato and the Μέγιστα Γένη of the *Sophist*," *Classical Quarterly*, Vol. XLVI, No. 1.

[17]*Ibid.*, p. 53.

[18]*Sophist* 257B. For the same thing restated, see *ibid.*, 257C; 258A, B, and E; 259B. These definitions of the term "nonbeing" explain the ambiguous section which Eslick quotes ("Plato's Dialectic of Non-Being," p. 48) from a later paragraph in this unambiguous treatment of the term. The passage, quoted in Fowler's translation from the Loeb, is from 259A-B: "The other, since it participates in being, is by reason of this participation, yet is not that which it participates, but other, and since it is other than being, must inevitably be non-being." This is what Dr. Eslick calls the existent nonbeing that enters into conflict with being to create the dialectic of existence. But since all four of these classes are called *this* kind of nonbeing, even "the same" must—by the same logic—be in conflict with being *as its opposite*. So must all the Forms, since they are, none of them, the same thing as this γένος, "being." Plato is here giving an example of the fallacy he has exposed at the beginning of the paragraph from which this quotation is taken: "Therefore let no one say that we claim 'non-being' is the opposite of being, nor that we dare to say a 'non-being' exists." The negative represents something *else*, not something *opposed* to being.

[19]*Sophist* 257D-258B.

[20]"Dyadic Character of Being in Plato," p. 14.

eing always accompanies and acts with otherness in the network of five nterwoven "things" which link and degrade the pure Forms in their tive and changing state. In this sense, being is an *im*perfection.

III. Testing the Theses against the Text

A. Dr. Eslick nowhere in his two articles quotes that passage from *The Sophist* which is related most directly to the existence of "the other." n 256C-257B Plato explains the only sense in which the term "nonbeing" an be used with meaning. He says that (in one sense) all of the four lasses considered—omitting, of course, the fifth "thing," being itself—are "nonbeing" since they are not essentially and primarily that fifth thing. Yet they all *participate* in being. Therefore

> when we say that a "nonbeing" exists, it is clear that we do not mean this is opposed to being (ἐναντίον τι ... τοῦ ὄντος), but merely other than existence itself (ἕτερον μόνον).[18]

The other *is*, but indefinitely. It can be any other existent thing than the one it is opposed to but no nonexistent thing. Other than *a* is *b*-to-*z*.[19] "Other" is not nonbeing but non-*this*-being or non-*that*-being; and falsehood is explained by this kind of "other" as well as the seeming validity of the loose term "nonbeing." Thus Plato solves the dialogue's original problem of error. An erroneous statement does not state something that *is not*; it enunciates a predicate which *is not the subject's*. *Is* is here merely a copulative, not an absolute verb. (We can say the same of the meaning of *is* in Plato's whole system as expounded in this dialogue. *Is* is not, to him, an absolute, an assertion that can stand alone. It is a mere copulative; existence joins, prods, and disturbs the Forms with action.)

B. Dr. Eslick takes the definition of being as δύναμις to mean that "no being is wholly self-enclosed and separated in complete isolation from others" and that, therefore, there are no stable and separate elements which can be joined in discourse to give certain knowledge.[20] But he is again allowing "being" to stand equally for "existent" and "reality," two different things in Plato's thought. A Form is self-enclosed and stable and one in *meaning*, in pure intelligibility; its relations in *existence* are a different matter, explained on an altogether different level than that of essence and truth—the level of the five extra-Formal (and infra-Formal) categories.

C. If "the other" were nonbeing, then being would be "the same," and there would be no need for five categories but only for four. Actually,

Plato says explicitly that "being" is different from all the other four (including "the same") yet can be joined with them all (including "the other").[21]

D. By making "being" a Form, Dr. Eslick defeats the purpose Plato means it to serve in this dialogue. The reason he analyzes the five "things" —and being among them—is to set them up as the media of combination between the Forms, showing how the stable Realities can become the source of fluid existence. He would not have attempted a solution to this problem by introducing an equally rigid and real Form to serve as the agent of change and combination. "Being" has something of the same *vehicular* position in his system that "prime matter" has in the Thomist.

E. Because Plato's relative "nonbeing"—that is, indeterminate "other-being"—is *absolute* nonbeing to Dr. Eslick, it immediately destroys all reality and truth whenever it is mixed with Forms or with words which stand for pure formal essence.

> The other when intermingled with the one produces many images of the one. Now, part of these imitations of the one is non-being itself . . . There are, therefore, for Plato no intrinsic differences between things in the essential order . . .[22]

And the essential order is the most important thing in Plato's philosophy! No wonder Dr. Eslick dares, after this statement, to claim that Plato became a complete skeptic. After all, how can anything else result when the ability to predicate depends directly on a perception of "otherness"—that is, of nonexistence itself!

But not only does "other" not mean this; the whole argument of the dialogue depends on the solid *fact* that man knows in the predicate. This dictates Plato's entire approach to metaphysics, which is that of a logician and an essentialist. His reason for accepting the five genera of combination is that these are necessary to preserve the unquestioned and undoubted fact of discourse and knowledge. This is the prime, irreducible, irrefutable *datum* of all his philosophy, the fact that *man knows.* It marks the difference between his philosophical system and that of Aquinas, whose existentialist starting point is the fact that *things are.* Both philosophies bear, in all their ramifications, the mark of their different starting points. Despite the value of his articles, and the metaphysical depth of his analyses (at times, perhaps, *because* he moves on a more profound level than most critics of the later dialogues) Dr. Eslick seems

[21] *Sophist* 258E-259B.

[22] "Dyadic Character of Being in Plato," p. 17.

to have confused these starting points. Only so could he make "being," "other," and "discourse," as used in this dialogue, bear the definitions which he gives them.

Plato on Being: A Reply to Mr. Wills

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The issues between Mr. Wills and myself are not too clear. I think this is principally because Mr. Wills has given a version of my position which is not only fragmentary and truncated, but which also misrepresents it on some important points. As a preliminary, therefore, to what I hope might be a more fruitful dialogue between us in the future, let me try to clarify certain areas of misunderstanding.

First, I am not attributing to Plato a sort of "dialectic between being and nonbeing," in the sense in which Mr. Wills seems to be understanding it. According to him, my position hinges upon finding in Plato a radical *opposition* between being and nonbeing. This I have never maintained, and no conclusions I have drawn depend in any way upon such a premise. Nonbeing, as the *relative*, is not of itself opposed to being, although it is distinguished from it, as the text in *Sophistes* 255 C-E makes clear. Plato is maintaining that the exclusive ground of differentiation is relationship rather than essential unity. There is, indeed, an opposition in Plato between the One and "nonbeing," as the Other or Indeterminate Dyad. The latter is defined precisely by its radical privation of unity. As Aristotle many times points out, Plato is one of the philosophers who find their first principles in *contraries*. But the *relative* is not opposed to being as its contrary. Indeed, there is no being which does not exist in relationship, although this is not of the *essence* of any being.

Secondly, Mr. Wills seems to suppose that, in my understanding of Plato, there is a need to make the Forms "exist in time" and that this is accomplished by an entry into the realm of predication. I have never supposed that Plato believed that Forms existed *in time* or that such a mode of existence, which would be *becoming* rather than true being, is even possible for them. That which exists *only* in relationship and consequently lacks the mode of *indivisible* being, sameness, and difference mentioned in the *Timaeus*, exists in time indeed. The second hypothesis of the *Parmenides* is dealing with such a mode of existence. It cannot possibly be that of the Forms. On this hypothesis, everything is predicable

of everything, and nothing possesses either the self-sameness or true otherness which are the joint foundations both for a universe of being and a universe of discourse. The Forms, on this hypothesis, would utterly lack *ousia*. Sensibles, however, do have this degraded mode of existence, involved in time and flux. In talking of them Plato tells us in *Timaeus* 49E that we should not even refer to them "as 'this' or 'that' or by any phrase that exhibits them as having permanent being." Unlike the Forms, sensibles cannot be objects of scientific knowledge but only of opinion. They are precisely the sensible "copies" of the *Timaeus*, moving across the face of the Receptacle.

Even a scientific knowledge which makes no claim to moving on the plane of essence but is *perinoetic*, to use Maritain's term, concerned only with quantitative relationships, and in this way achieving a precise measurement of the *differences* of things—even this scientific knowledge cannot have such sensibles as its object.

The kind of being or existence which is found in this sensible flux is certainly only that of a degraded image of true reality. The existence of sensible things is only qualitative, to use the language of the *Timaeus*, not substantial. They exist at all only by existing in *another*, the Receptacle. But to suppose, as Mr. Wills seems to be doing, that this is the exclusive meaning of being for Plato is wholly unwarranted and is, indeed, a remarkable error. The *divisible* being, sameness, and otherness of the sensible flux is precisely *image* being and is radicated finally in the non-being of the Receptacle. Unless there existed indivisible being, sameness, and otherness *on the level of the Forms*, even such fleeting images would have nothing to image.

I do not think Mr. Wills has understood, however, the problem of scientific knowledge for Plato on the level of the Forms themselves. Mr. Wills is devoted, it seems, like the "Friends of the Forms" in the *Sophistes*, to the earlier Platonic version of the Forms as simple, immobile unities, enjoying a splendid isolation not only from sensibles but from each other. I have tried to show, in the two articles he is concerned with, that being even on the plane of archetypal reality demands for Plato composition and dynamic inter-relatedness for Forms to exist and to be intelligible. The primary problem of the *Sophistes* is certainly that of the second part of the *Parmenides*—the intercommunion or interparticipation among the Forms themselves. There is here no question of their presence in sensibles or of a purely *logical* composition and division of them to be effected by categories not themselves belonging to the domain of the really real. Indeed, the first part of the *Parmenides* shows that participation understood as any kind of "physical" presence or inherence of Forms in sensibles is impossible; and the radical *chorismos* of the Forms from the

sensible realm is vindicated. The ultimate intelligibility of sensibles is borrowed or reflected from a higher realm and is not intrinsic to them. But for this higher realm of Forms to have real intelligibility they must have within themselves a power of acting and being acted upon, of standing in an ordered context of relationships which will alone truly differentiate them from each other. This dynamism of Forms has nothing to do with an ingression into the stream of sensible flux and temporal existence. It is rather the indispensable *metaphysical* foundation for Plato's later dialectic of Collection and Division.

Mr. Wills, our new "Friend of the Forms," seeks to preserve their simple unity and purity unsullied by any dynamism. And, indeed, there is a sense in which the Forms remain, in Plato's later thought, simple in *essence*. For their essence is Unity itself, the "Form" of all Forms. It is, of course, as Aristotle and St. Thomas point out, not the One which for them is convertible with Being but rather the utterly simple and indivisible unity which is the principle of number in the genus of quantity. (This is why the Forms become *numbers*.) But while such a principle of essence functions to measure, determine, and establish *orderly* relationships in a manifold, its radical simplicity and univocity prevents it from being the ground either of the existence of a manifold or of *relationships* in it. Such entities exist as an inter-related (and hence differentiated) many not in virtue of their essence, therefore, but by virtue of a principle in them which is *other* than their essential unity. They are differentiated and scientifically knowable because of their position in an ordered series.

I think Plato in his last period became profoundly convinced that a multitude of simples could neither exist nor be known, and that in such hypothetical "entities" there could be no foundation for any ordering relationships. This is surely the lesson of the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides* and of the third hypothesis of the *Theaetetus*. It also, unfortunately, entails the consequences which seem so distasteful to Mr. Wills and other "Friends of the Forms." It means the abandonment of the dream of the dialectic of essence which is proposed as the ideal in the central books of the *Republic*. The dialectic of Collection and Division of the later dialogues is a very different kind of knowledge indeed. But for Plato it is nevertheless real knowledge about the real relations of the Forms. It seems to me that on the basis of Mr. Wills's interpretation neither the dialectic of essence nor the "second best" type of the later dialogues can be saved.

In order to see how Mr. Wills's interpretation of Plato entails such a double skepticism, let us examine the consequences of his theory of the

five genera of the *Sophistes*. Being, Same, Other, Motion, and Rest are not Forms, according to Wills, but merely *logical* connectives or categories not themselves on the level of the really real. Their function seems analogous to that of the Kantian forms of sensibility and categories of understanding. The Kantian categories constitute objects of knowledge by organizing the inchoate rabble of the manifold of sense, imposing upon them the alien order and relationship of mind. It is an order which is not ontologically grounded in the data themselves, and the resultant "knowledge" never attains a metaphysical plane. It makes little difference whether such purely logical connectives organize a manifold of sense or of Forms. In neither case is there any genuine knowledge either of things in themselves, in their essential reality, or of the *real* relationships of ultimate realities. Mr. Wills, in his effort to maintain the purity of the Forms uncontaminated in their own realm by either existence or relationship, has very effectively removed them from the possibility of any knowledge whatsoever. I do not believe such an interpretation of Plato is tenable.

Mr. Wills seems implicitly to agree with me that the Forms are not intelligibly bonded in virtue of their essence. But unless there is a foundation in the Forms themselves for such bonding, a foundation which is really distinct from their essence, they can neither exist nor be known. To reduce the combinatory "genera" to merely logical bonds, with no ontological status, is to leave us not only unable to look upon Beauty bare but incapable of anything save logical exercises "combining and contrasting meaningless counters".

The Odyssey of an Augustinian Text

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In commenting on Psalm 145 St. Augustine asks, "Who is it who says *lauda, anima mea, Dominum?*" It is not the body, which is inferior to the soul; it cannot counsel its superior. By that part which is called *mens rationalis* the soul counsels itself when it

> notices that certain of its inferior parts are disturbed by worldly motions, and by the pull of earthly desires goes out towards exterior things, and leaves its interior God. Then, it recalls itself *ab exterioribus ad interiora, ab inferioribus ad superiora* and says *lauda, anima mea, Dominum.*[1]

The rational soul stands in a middle position. All earthly goods and man's body itself are inferior to the soul. The soul is superior to the body, and God to all created things. The soul has received a law to adhere to the superior and rule the inferior.

Gilson has called the formula "from the exterior to the interior, from the inferior to the superior" in the above text "famous." [2] But, it seems, it was not famous enough. An erroneous tradition, use, or translation of this formula has led some philosophers to claim it in support of their doctrine, or of their interpretation of Augustine's doctrine, on the method of obtaining knowledge of the transcendent. These present notes will attempt to show that this claim is not justified.

In facing the problem of transcendence in the early part of his career, Maurice Blondel was convinced that with the fragmentary data of perception and scientific reflection as unique materials there would be no means to reconstruct beings and remake the concrete in our minds. But each aspect, which we disengage from things with the aid, and to the profit, of our personal experience, opens up new perspectives to our knowledge and action. We come to think the real and to realize thought more, if we go

> *ab exterioribus ad interiora, ab interioribus ad superiora.* But, if the intermediary of these three terms which St. Augustine points out is suppressed, the bridge would be broken and only incommunicable entities would be present. From objective knowledge to the reality of subjects there is no direct passage by the theoretical way and abstract

dialectic. One can attain and define transcendence only by the way of immanence, exteriority by interiority.[3]

Blondel did not list the source of the Latin formula in the works of Augustine, nor, as is evident, did he quote him accurately. Either he did not actually read our text but borrowed it from another in its mistaken form, or he read the text but mistook the letter "f" for a "t" in the word *inferioribus*. But the latter does not seem likely. The whole passage of Augustine's commentary makes it clear that there is no "intermediary term." It is true that Augustine said that "the rational soul has a middle position" between God and all that is inferior to it. But there is no exact identity between the *interiora* and the *inferiora*. Some of the *inferiora* (St. Augustine mentions earthly things as gold, silver, animals, trees, and the sun, moon, and stars) are also the *exteriora;* some (man's body and the inferior parts of the soul) are not interior, strictly speaking. Further, the term "superior" is not limited to God because the soul is superior to the body. This, it seems, is why St. Augustine used the neuter gender for all these terms. But the main point is that we are not dealing here with a single movement of three distinct terms but with two successive movements involving four terms. The soul first enters into itself (*revocat*) and then, finding God there, praises Him who is superior to all created things.

In all probability Father Pierre Scheuer, S.J., who was much indebted to the thought of Blondel, read the work just dicussed. In treating the problem of the proper mode that the affirmation of God takes in human intelligence, Scheuer wrote:

> St. Augustine has a happy formula which sums up our doctrine—*ab exterioribus ad interiora, per interiora ad superiora.* This formula expresses the three degrees of being which are given indivisibly. The human self is first of all exterior to itself. As the 'I-object' it is the body with its relations; the self is identified with the material element. The second moment: it enters into itself and knows itself as such, as a self. Third moment: in knowing itself, it seizes at once the necessary identity of the real and the intelligible, because it is itself a parallel affirmation and transcends itself.[4]

[1]*Enarratio in Psalmum 145:5* (Migne *PL*, XXXVII, 1887).

[2]Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York, Random House), p. 594.

[3]M. Blondel, "Le point de départ de la recherche philosophique," *Annales de philosophie chrétienne*, Series 4, II (1906), 237.

[4]"Deux textes inédits," *Nouvelle revue theologique*, LXXIX (1957), 825.

[5]*Enarratio in Psalmum 145:5*

[6]*Introduction à l'étude de St. Augustin* (2nd ed. Paris: J. Vrin, 1943), p. 24.

[7]*History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, p. 77.

Apart from the minor point that Scheuer has introduced a new preposition (*per*) into the formula, we must hold that his thesis finds no support from it. The body of man is certainly not one of the *exteriora*; it is one of the *inferiora*. Most important of all, St. Augustine is not concerned here with any proof for the existence of God but with the praise of Him by the soul, which "already adheres to the Lord and aspires to Him . . . the interior God." [5]

The same observation may be made about Gilson's use of the formula as a summary of Augustine's method for proving the existence of God: [his thought] *va de l'extérieur à l'intérieur et de l'intérieur au supérieur.*[6] As a good historian, Gilson is not ignorant of the original text which is cited in a footnote. However, he justifies a three-term translation because he interprets the term *inferioribus* as "what is inferior in the interior." In one sense of the word this is legitimate. St. Augustine does speak about the "inferior parts of the soul." But if this were its only meaning, the word should have been put in the feminine gender. In fact, as we have already seen, most of the *inferiora* are also the *exteriora*. Even if in a later work Gilson literally translates the formula,[7] he is still not justified in taking it out of its original context and linking it up with any proof of the existence of God.

Eleventh Annual Meeting of the Missouri State Philosophical Association

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The Missouri State Philosophical Association met for the eleventh time at Stephens College in Columbia on Friday and Saturday, October 17 and 18.

The program followed the traditional association pattern: three independent papers on Friday afternoon, the presidential address after the association dinner on Friday evening, and a symposium, consisting of three papers about the same subject, on Saturday morning.

The first paper on Friday was a development of John Locke's subject-object relationship by S. Morris Eames (Washington University). In a relational theory of meaning, symbol meaning must be tested by sign signification. The connection between symbol meaning and sign signification is existential involvement or feeling.

The second paper, by Reverend William S. Rossner, S.J., (Rockhurst College), presented a metaphysics of love based on a recent article of Maritain's "The Sin of the Angels." Prior to an act of free choice by which the rational creature loves God there are four moments in the will. The first is the ontological love of nature for God. The elicited love of nature for the good, identical with the intra-elicited ontological love of nature for God, is the second. These moments can never be lost. The last two, elicited love of nature for God and the inclination to love of free option for God, can be lost by the rational creature that sins. If the rational creature loves God by an act of free choice it loves God immediately and it has the four moments mentioned above.

The third paper was a clear analysis of evil, being, and consciousness in the philosophies of Leibniz, Plotinus, and Aquinas by Edward B. Costello (Missouri University). In the *De Malo*, Aquinas compares evil in the will to evil in the work of the carpenter. When a carpenter does not look at the rule, no evil is involved. There is evil, a privation of due good, when the carpenter cuts without looking at the rule. When the will does not move the intellect to look at the rule of human actions, right reason, no evil occurs. But moral evil, a privation of due good, results when the will acts freely without moving the intellect to look at the rule.

At the association dinner, John A. Gates (Westminster College), the retiring president, proposed that paradox and myth have a meaning. The paper provoked a spirited discussion of the criterion of truth for a myth. Before one can ask about the criterion of truth for a myth, one must define what a myth is.

The title of the symposium on Saturday morning was "Representation, Form, and Expression in the Arts." Papers were read by Lewis E. Hahn (Washington University), James G. Rice (Stephens College), and Arthur Berndston (Missouri University).

Leonard Eslick (Saint Louis University) is the president for 1959; and James A. Reagan (Saint Louis University) will retain his position as secretary-treasurer. The next meeting will be held at Rockhurst College, Kansas City, Missouri. A vote of thanks was extended to Stephens College for its cordial hospitality.

Analyse critique de la notion de validité. **By Paul Frankard. Louvain: Nauwelaerts; Paris: Beatrice Nauwelaerts, 1958. Pp. 138. Paper, fr. b. 120.**

This study of psychological tests aims at clarifying the notion of "validity." The author concludes that "validity" depends essentially on the process of validation. This is viewed as a special case of the more general principle that the validity of a scientific theory rests on the quantitative data obtained, and the validity of a test on the value of the theory it confirms. The author therefore urges a more rigorous analysis of the results of tests in relation to their use and the criteria employed.

Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine, a Fourteenth Century Augustinian. **By H. A. Oberman. Utrecht: Kemink & Zoon N.V., 1958. Pp. [xi] + 246. Paper, fl. 10.**

This study of Bradwardine is, as the author intends, entirely theological; preceding studies of the Oxford doctor have been primarily philosophical and to that extent defective—and by this view Dr. Oberman seems to imply that Bradwardine's philosophy is not adequately harmonized with his theology in certain points.

The study begins with a general historical background and particular brief surveys of the thought of Aureolus, Durandus, Occam, Holcot, and Woodham. In these chapters the author makes good use of the best of recent scholarship (and, in general, also throughout the rest of the book). Chapters III and IV deal with the (primarily philosophical) ideas of the sovereignty of God and the freedom of the will. Here the author shows that Bradwardine insists on both of these ideas—on the first against the Pelagians, on the second against the Averroistic determinists. It also becomes clear that Bradwardine's solutions are governed by theological considerations and lack a suitable philosophical coherence. The next three chapters are more theological still, dealing with predestination, prescience, sin, grace, and justification. Particularly in the last point Bradwardine's thought appears philosophically weak. The final chapter considers Bradwardine's influence, and the author finally concludes that he was not really a forerunner of the Reformation.

In spite of careful scholarship, there are many points where the author's interpretation seems defective, especially in points of Catholic theology; the author's command of the English language is not always adequate, and the proofreading has been quite ineffective. These deficiencies obviously lessen the value of the work, but it should be repeated that the book contains much sound scholarship and presents a balanced picture of its subject.

Aristotle on Art and Nature. **By M. J. Charlesworth. Auckland: Auckland Univ. College, 1957. Pp. 40. Paper.**

This is a brief textual and philosophical study of Aristotle's theory of art. Admitting that Aristotle does not have a complete theory expressed in any one place, the author contends that enough can be found to remove the alleged contradictions and to provide an intelligible framework for the *Poetics.* He investigates the meaning of "art" in Aristotle, the kind of causality found in "making" something, and the imitation of nature by art, and then considers the Aristotelian theory of the fine arts. The study is an excellent one, well grounded in textual analysis, and should do much to remove some of the still current misunderstandings of the Aristotelian theory of art.

Aufgaben der Philosophie. **By Emerich Coreth, S.J., Otto Muck, S.J., and Johann Schasching, S.J. Ed. Emerich Coreth, S.J. Innsbruck: Felizian Rauch, 1958. Pp. 210. Paper, $3.30.**

The first essay, by Father Coreth, is entitled "Metaphysics as Problem." After a brief historical consideration, he maintains that contemporary thinkers demand a scientific metaphysics which can only arise through a transcendental investigation. This can be accomplished through the method of transcendental reduction (upon which a later deduction can be based). This involves finding in the experience of actual being the conditions of being itself: the first principles, the scope of being, the perfection of being in the perfection of the self, and interpersonal relations.

The second essay, by Otto Muck, S.J., deals with methodology and metaphysics. Father Muck considers that the special sciences are distinct from metaphysics but that metaphysics must have a unifying function. In a metaphysical theory of method, metaphysics is to establish the interrelationships of the special sciences, and that theory is to be the best which is the most realistic.

The third essay, by Father Schasching, deals with the relationships be-

tween sociology and philosophy. He recalls the origin of sociology in a breaking away from philosophy and follows its history to a point where the question of interrelations can again arise. In discussing this relation, he relies for his examples on Georges Gurvitch, Sorokin, Leopold von Wiese, Helmut Schoeck. On the philosophical side, he presents the analysis of Johannes Messner. He concludes that most of the work remains to be done.

***Connaissance et amour. Essai sur la philosophie de Gabriel Marcel.* By Jean-Pierre Bagot. Paris: Beauchesne, 1958. Pp. 248. Paper, fr. 1,450.**

This study of Marcel's thought is the only extensive one that views it chronologically. In a brief historical introduction, Kant, Jacobi, and Hegel are seen to provide a background from which the work of Marcel emerges. This work has three phases. In the first period, Marcel accepts the idealistic and rationalistic conception of knowledge, and contrasts it completely with faith and love. But such an opposition makes thought sterile and love unintelligible. Checked in his attempt to rediscover man and God through the way of noncognitive love, Marcel next turned to a phenomenology of experience, in which sensation, one's own body, and the existence of, and relationships to, other persons imply an intentionality of knowledge as well as a realism of love and consequently a realistic metaphysics. In the third stage, Marcel elaborated his views on reflection, being and mystery, freedom, faith, and love. In these analyses, reason begins to receive an authentic place and function; and the mutual interplay of knowledge and love is recognized and used to surpass both rationalism and voluntarism. The author, however, points out that the exigencies of logical analysis have not yet been fully satisfied in Marcel's work and that it must therefore be viewed as in some very important ways unachieved.

***Der dialektische Materialismus und das Problem der Entstehung des Lebens. Zur Theorie von A. I. Oparin.* By Gustav A. Wetter, S.J. Munich: Anton Pustet, 1958. Pp. 71. Paper, DM 4.40.**

Oparin's theory of the origin of life is arousing widespread interest. Though he bases himself on the unquestioned validity of dialectical materialism, he brings to the discussion a good knowledge of biochemistry and shows an adeptness in explaining how the conditions of life can be progressively made possible. His critique of mechanism is excellent—so

good, in fact, that the author can turn Oparin's remarks against him. Oparin's criticism of vitalism is also for the most part good, except that he blandly assumes that if one is not a materialist he is necessarily an idealist and holds that the vital principle is spiritual.

The present work is a good summary of Oparin's theory, developed from official German translations checked against the original Russian work. The criticism is brief but often quite pointed. On the other hand, the failure to distinguish an Aristotelian "entelechy" carefully from all vitalistic theories sometimes interferes with this criticism. So also does the total rejection of chance.

It would be a good thing if the present work were translated into English and made available to the same readers who now have the opportunity to read Oparin in translation.

Diccionario de Filosofía. **By Walter Brugger, S.J. Trans. José María Vélez Cantarell. 2d. ed. Barcelona: Editorial Herder, 1958. Pp. 626. $7.00; paper, $6.20.**

The first Spanish translation of Father Brugger's dictionary was published in 1953; since then the fifth and sixth editions of the German original have added a number of new articles, expanded the historical section, and brought the bibliographies up to date. This second Spanish edition incorporates all the new matter of the latest German edition. The translation seems to be very good.

Les échelles de mesure en psychologie de la sensation. **By A.-M. Perreault, O.P. Rome: Angelicum, 1957 . Pp. 84.**

This is a reprint of an article published in *Angelicum*, 1957. It deals principally with psychological facts and techniques; in a few paragraphs the author shows that such measurement is not in conflict with the principles of St. Thomas.

Die Erkenntnistheorie des dialektischen Materialismus. **By Josef de Vries, S.J. Munich: Anton Pustet, 1958. Pp. 188.**

This is a careful and detailed study by an author already well known for his contributions to epistemology. The book is divided into two parts. In the first part, the general theory of knowledge of Marxism is presented from the writings of Marxist authors. The presentation begins with the Marxist interpretation of realism as materialism. Next, sense experience is

considered as a reflection of reality. The criterion of truth as "praxis" is fully explored. The nature of thought is considered in itself and in relation to language; the axioms or principles receive special consideration. Relative and absolute truth are studied, and it is seen that Marxism denies relativism. Finally, the notion of ideology is explored and compared with the absolute validity claimed for dialectical materialism. In the second part the author takes up his criticisms. After pointing out that there are few chances for any common ground, he finds that Marxists accept formal logic. Hence, he examines their theory of knowledge in the light of formal logic, centering his analysis around the following points: the identification of realism and materialism, the criterion of "praxis," the ground of the axioms, and the contradictions contained in the notion of ideology. Next he takes up the ontological foundations offered by the Marxists, considering the notion of experience and thought; then he takes up the soul, mind, and God. This is a very thorough study, one of the few attempts to consider Marxist epistemology on purely philosophical grounds.

La Filosofía de Ortega y Gasset. **By Santiago Ramírez, O.P. Barcelona: Editorial Herder, 1958. Pp. 474. $5.30; paper, $4.50.**

This is an exposition and criticism. In the first section of the first part (pp. 17-154), Ortega's philosophy is presented by way of direct quotation and organized around the themes of the reform of the bases of philosophy and of the various parts of philosophy. In the second section (pp. 155-81), the author repeats in summary form and in less rhetorical fashion the ideas presented in the first section. The second part is an evaluation of this philosophy. The first section considers Ortega's philosophy philosophically, again organized around much the same themes (pp. 185-368). The second section criticizes this philosophy from the viewpoint of Christian faith and theology.

According to the author, the main ideas of Ortega are the notion of being as human existence, the notion of man as not having a nature but as a being-in-progress through life, the notion of the ego as the individual "project" of man in his world, the notion that man's good lies in society. This philosophy is described as "culture-vitalism" and as "race-vitalism." It entails a denial of objective science, of logic, and of metaphysics as traditionally understood, as well as of natural theology, ethics, and Christian faith.

The presentation is accurate; the author pays tribute to the real skill

of Ortega in writing and to his penetration in laying bare modern problems. The criticism is detailed and many readers will feel that it is not quite sympathetic; it will be admitted, however, that Ortega is not misrepresented.

Friendship in Saint Augustine. **By Marie Aquinas McNamara, O.P. Fribourg: University Press, 1958. Pp. xix + 231. Paper, fr. s. 16.60; DM 16.**

This is a study of the friendships which St. Augustine had, with only a brief summary of what he had to say—mostly in passing—about the nature of friendship. According to the author, St. Augustine's attitude went through four stages: (1) a confusion of friendship with pleasant association, (2) the classical ideal of friendship, (3) the transformation of the classical ideal into a Christian conception, (4) Christian friendship as a form of charity. The study is detailed and carefully worked out; it constitutes a real contribution to our knowledge of St. Augustine as a man.

Die geistige Einwirkung des Materialismus und die Wissenschaft des Ostens. **By Joseph Meurers. Munich: Anton Pustet, 1957. Pp. 46. Paper, DM 2.20.**

The author begins by showing that the belief in the truth and inevitable success of dialectical materialism is a real force and traces it to a reliance on the totalitarian collectivity as a protection against insecurity. He next argues that as materialism Marxism favors natural science, especially physics, but as dialectical it advocates a method suited only for social and psychological sciences. The result, he maintains, is that physical research is fostered but is mixed with *ad hoc* hypotheses and claims that distort the very meaning of science as a whole and prevent even the scientific achievements from working for man's good.

Histoire de la philosophie moderne. **By Roger Verneaux. Paris: Beauchesne, 1958. Pp. 204. Paper.**

This work is intended as an elementary textbook on its subject. It covers Descartes, Pascal, Spinoza, Malebranche, Leibniz, Wolf, British empiricism, Kant, and German idealism. Bibliographies indicate the best French edition, suggest one or the other basic writing, and mention one or two secondary sources which can be used with the least possible background. The presentation aims at clearness, simplicity, and fundamental accuracy. Conceived as a volume in a "Course of Thomistic Philosophy," Verneaux

takes a critical stand toward his subject from the viewpoint of Thomistic realism.

Hyle. La Materia en el Corpus Aristotelicum. **By Luis Cencillo, S.J. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1958. Pp. xix + 197. Paper, 60 ptas.**

This study of *hyle* accepts the chronological views of Jaeger and tentatively refuses to exclude the multiple authorship theory of Zuercher. These views make the author prepared to see quite different meanings of *hyle* and even perhaps irreconcilable views. The author begins by insisting that the problem of the subject of first philosophy cannot be decided completely from the extant writings attributed to Aristotle and that even the problem of substance remains obscure. Next he investigates the pre-Aristotelian doctrines of matter. After this he examines what the texts have to say about *hyle* and finds three functions: that of physical source, of logical negation, and ontological potential principle. In terms of these functions he examines the various attributes of matter. The author next turns to a linguistic investigation. Matter is discovered as foundation for substantial change or (analogously) for change of place; matter is discovered by abstraction from qualities and from individuality; matter may be proximate or ultimate. In this last phase the author questions the accuracy of the interpretation by the Scholastics that form is always united directly to prime matter.

In an appendix the author discusses the chronology of the Aristotelian works as given by various scholars and concludes with his chronology of the *Metaphysics*. There are also a classified bibliography and indices of passages, authors cited, and subjects.

The study is detailed and provocative. There is one questionable procedure, that of naming one type of Aristotelian analysis "logical." It would be more accurate to speak of a "predicational analysis" and to recognize that for Aristotle a predicational analysis had a metaphysical (ontological) bearing.

Kleinere Schriften. **Vol. III, *Von Neukantianismus zur Ontologie.* By Nicolai Hartmann. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1958. Pp. 395.**

This third volume contains seventeen papers, one (on the philosophical problems of biology) running over a hundred pages, several other long ones (on various logical and "ontological" problems), and the rest quite brief. Six book reviews are added in an appendix.

All these materials are necessary for an understanding of the work of Hartmann, and many of them had become unobtainable. The complete edition is a great contribution.

Das Menschenbild des dialektischen Materialismus. **By Hans Köhler. Munich: Anton Pustet, 1957. Pp. 31. Paper, DM 2.20.**

This short study is very helpful in understanding the Soviet view of man. Not only is man understood to be material; he is also entirely bound to society. In the beginning, the individual was entirely integrated into society; then society became alienated from man (the class society, the antithesis); finally, society and man will become integrated again in the new classless society. In this final synthesis, the individual will become absorbed in the collectivity and find therein his fulfillment. Thus, the author explains, it is possible for Communist spokesmen to say that there is perfect freedom in the totalitarian state—not a freedom of choice—and by no means a freedom from, or in, society—but in the sense of a freedom from other individuals.

Metaphysica Operationis Humanae. **By Johannes B. Lotz, S.J. Rome: Gregorian Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. xxiv + 228. Paper, $3.50.**

This analysis of human action is a systematic exposition, in a positive and pedagogical form, of the nature of knowledge and of the transcendentals, containing ideas which Father Lotz had previously published in textual, historical, and critical books and articles. Though in a sense there is nothing new in this book, the systematic presentation makes for completeness, provides an opportunity for understanding the doctrine as a whole, and allows it to be related to other aspects of metaphysics and theory of knowledge.

In an introductory section, Father Lotz gives a clear account of the transcendental method as used by him; he points out that it presupposes that we have established the fact of true knowledge, as well the nature of man and especially of the intellect, and the existence and intellectual nature of God. In this context, he asserts that the transcendental method uncovers the formal a-priori conditions of knowledge in such a way as to justify the previously discovered fact of true knowledge.

The analysis of knowledge is especially an analysis of judgment. Beginning with a general analysis of activity and knowledge, the author proceeds to consider the judgment as most formally a knowledge of the *esse* of being. He then compares the analysis and synthesis present in the judgment. Based on this study of judgment is the study of the a-priori

conditions of judgment. Here the author first studies the senses, and here he lays great stress on the a-priori, synthesizing forms of the *sensus communis*, the imagination, and the *vis cogitativa* (to which he ascribes a knowledge of singular substance, or thing, or a sensible schema of "thing"). These synthesizing forms, especially the last, find their completion and meaning in the judgment, especially as the latter attains *esse simpliciter* and *esse subsistens*. Indeed, the objectivity of human knowledge is finally explicable only as a participation in the Divine intellect, whose knowledge is creatively constitutive of its object.

In the second major part of the book, Father Lotz considers the transcendentals as attained by human activity. In an introductory section, he places the problem textually in St. Thomas and historically. Next, he approaches the attributes according to the transcendental method, beginning with the study of unity. In a transitional chapter, he studies activity itself, phenomenologically and ontologically, paying special attention to its relation to *esse* and its essential structure. In the study of truth, he refers to the doctrines of Heidegger and Hegel, analyzes the nature of truth, and relates truth to being and to subsistent truth. In the study of the good, he also studies appetite in general, and especially freedom, considering the latter as a way to come to transcendental goodness. Finally, he gives a transcendental deduction of the convertibility of being and the good, and of subsistent good.

Newman's Idee einer Universität. **By Wolfgang Renz, O.S.B. Fribourg: Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. xxii + 338. Paper, fr. s. 18.65; DM 18.**

This is a thorough and detailed study. It begins with an analysis and comparison of the various editions, and investigates the extent to which Oxford served as an example. The doctrine of the *Idea* is then examined under four heads: the theory of science, theology, the purpose of a university, and the relation between a university and the Church. The analysis is careful and fully documented. The author shows that Newman's ultimate principles are often merely implicit and that sometimes, when an argument is advanced, it is misleading, at variance with the implicit principles. But he contends that Newman's practical insights were far ahead of his time and suggests that they could with profit be considered as guides to contemporary problems. This is particularly the case with regard to the notion of "general" or "liberal" education with which Newman often identifies "philosophy"

Ontologie du langage. **By Gustav Siewerth. Trans. with introd. and notes by Marc Zemb. Preface by Brice Parain. Bruges: Desclée-de Brouwer, 1958. Pp. 187. Paper, fr. 960, fr. b. 104.**

This translation of *Wort und Bild* (1952) includes the original German text on facing pages. Brice Parain in his brief preface (pp. 7-16) compares two modes of philosophizing with algebra and arithmetic. The long introduction (pp. 19-73) begins by explaining the differences between the German and French titles, and gives a brief biography and bibliography of the author. Then comes an analysis of the metaphysics contained in the work (pp. 29-42), which is said to have three main phases: essential form, intentional form, and expressive form. This is followed by a detailed analysis of the vocabulary of Siewerth (pp. 43-54), which points out the great preponderance of verbs and nouns, the difference of modes of thought arising from this difference, and the problems of translation. The notes (pp. 151-87) most often concern problems of translation.

In the thought of Siewerth, language is not only the tool of thought and of metaphysics but in a way also the cause of reasoning and the source of metaphysics. This latter relation is to be understood not in the sense of logical positivism but rather after the manner of Heidegger and Husserl. This problem deserves the attention it has been getting in contemporary thought.

Il Pensiero Americano Contemporanea. Filosofia, Epistemologia, Logica. **Ed. Ferruccio Rossi-Landi. Milan: Edizioni di Comunità, 1958. Pp. xi + 340. L. 4,000.**

Il Pensiero Americano Contemporanea. Scienze Sociali. **Ed. Ferruccio Rossi-Landi. Milan: Edizioni di Comunità, 1958. Pp. 11 + 390. L. 4,000.**

The point of view taken in fastening upon topics is that "American" thought is only entirely native and original thought—with a consequent distortion of the picture of what is being done in American learned circles.

The volume dealing with philosophy considers semantic therapy (Francesco Barone), sociality in the educational theory of John Dewey (Lamberto Borghi), symbol and metaphor in aesthetics (Gillo Dorfles), historical method (Paolo Rossi), universes of discourse and ideal languages (Ferruccio Rossi-Landi), language analysis (Uberto Scarpelli), operationalism in physics (Vittorio Somenzi), strict implication and modal logic (Giuseppe Vaccarino), and transactionalism (Aldo Visalberghi). Most of these authors have had contacts with American writers but very limited ones.

The volume dealing with social science takes up culture, personality, constitutionalism, pragmatism, motivation and perception in psychology, positivism and juridical realism, institutionalism, the Kinsey report, and American democracy.

There are bibliographies in both volumes; the principle of selection is not discoverable.

Problemi Filosofici in Marsilio Ficino. **By Michele Schiavone. Milan: Marzorati, 1957. Pp. 327. Paper, L. 2,500.**

This study of the philosophy of Marsilio Ficino takes up three points: his conception of reality, his conception of the Absolute, and his theory of knowledge. On the basis of a careful and quite full quotation and analysis of texts, Schiavone shows the basic Platonism of Ficino and the modifications introduced from various sources. Among these are the notion of the world as a living animal, the special treatment of act and potency in the analysis of change, the importance of space and time. In the conception of God, Platonism also shows up, mingled with theological concepts that are presented by Ficino as if derived from purely philosophical reasoning. In theory of knowledge, Ficino holds for the spirituality of sensation, caused by the vital, spiritual power in things. Intellect differs from sense inasmuch as it reaches the universal and the substance of things. In very many instances, the author quotes parallel passages from William of Auvergne.

Riflessioni su Temi Filosofici Fondamentali. **By Louis De Raeymaeker. Milan: Marzorati, 1957. Pp. 96. Paper, L. 800.**

This is an Italian translation of a series of lectures given by the Louvain scholar at the University of Genoa in March, 1956. Of the four essays, three were published in *Humanitas*, the fourth in *Giornale di Metafisica*. The first topic is that of the transformation of the ontology of antiquity into the metaphysics of being by St. Thomas. The second is that of the experience of being and its metaphysical significance. The third is the problem of causality. The fourth is that of Thomism, neo-Thomism, and philosophical diversity.

Salzburger Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Psychologie. **Ed. Faculty of the Philosophisches Institut of Salzburg. Munich: Anton Pustet. I (1957), 248; II (1958), 240.**

This new publication has made an auspicious beginning. In the first volume, the following articles appeared: "Ontologie der Zeit nach objektivierender Betrachtungsweise," by Dom Beda Thum, O.S.B.; "Ein Aristoteles-Fragment der Stiftsbibliothek," by Albert Auer; "Glossen über den gemässigten Realismus," by Johannes Bauer; "Geschichtslehre aus Philosophie und Theologie," by Joseph Berhnardt; "War Aristoteles 'Aristoteliker'?" by E. Joseph Schächer; and "Naturrecht heute," by Albert Auer. There are also two articles on psychology. The article of Dr. Schächer is a long study of the thesis of Reverend Josef Zürcher, S.J., the reactions of the reviewers to it, and his own evaluation.

The second volume contains the following: "Eckehart-Studien," by Albert Auer; "Zur 'quarta via' des Aquinaten," by Johannes Bauer; "Naturtendenz und Freiheit nach Duns Scotus," by Walter Hoeres; "Stensen—Spinoza—Leibniz in fruchtbaren Gespräch," by Ildefons Betschart; "Die Stellung der Psychologie in der Gesamtheit der Wissenschaften," by Benedikt von Hebenstreit; "Ontologie der Zeitrelationen," by Beda Thum, O.S.B.; and "Zur Dialektik der Reflexion bei Husserl," by Walter Hoeres. There are again several articles on psychology. In addition, there is a brief account of the Catholic University of Salzburg and a few short book reviews.

Sein und Ursprünglichkeit. **By Hans-Eduard Hengstenberg. Foreword by L.-B. Geiger, O.P. Munich: Anton Pustet, 1958. Pp. xxiv + 168. Paper.**

This is an attempt to give a philosophical exposition of the idea of creation. The author contends that for a modern the word "cause" does not mean what it meant for medievals or ancient philosophers; that in its contemporary usage it necessarily involves space and time, reciprocity, and limitation. He concludes that for moderns a causal proof for the existence of God is meaningless and is considered impossible. He proposes instead to use phenomenological insights to ground a new proof. This he does through the notion of the *Sinn* (untranslatable by any single word) of things. Things have *Sinn*, and this *Sinn* cannot be explained by the things themselves or from any other limited thing; it must therefore come from a *Sinnurheber*, who is necessarily personal. The author claims this as an advantage over proofs that conclude merely to an *ens a se*. (In addition to the author's use of the term "cause" in a Kantian sense, one should also note his use of the term "analogy" to mean an a-pari argument.)

That the effort undertaken here is important and significant cannot be doubted; that the fourth and fifth "ways" of St. Thomas could be elaborated through the use of phenomenological starting points seems possible; that the present book is entirely successful seems doubtful.

Ser Participado y Ser Subsistente en la Metafisica de Enrique de Gante. **By José Gómez Caffarena, S.J. "Analecta Gregoriana," Vol. XCIII. Rome: Gregorian Univ. Press, 1958. Pp. xi + 283. Paper, $3.50.**

Henry of Ghent, the author concludes, is basically an Augustinian with Avicennan modifications. He draws this conclusion from a study of being in Henry. He begins by considering being as known; as conditions for metaphysical knowledge, he finds Henry insisting on divine illumination as a guarantee of truth and on the intentional world of essence as the object of metaphysics; this world of essence is constituted by the *esse essentiae*. The *esse existentiae* of participated being is an "accident" of essence, distinct from essence by an "intentional distinction." *Esse essentiae* is also an internal principle of finite essence. Connected with these points are considerations on the various compositions in a finite essence, the logic of the universals as analyzed by Henry, the relation between finiteness and contingence, and the historical sources of these ideas.

Next the author studies Henry's doctrine on subsistent Being. Here a question arises about the relation between infinity and necessity. Henry's special notion of the analogy of being is considered as consisting mainly in the possibility of predication about God. Henry's proofs for the existence of God are studied at length, and the special character of the proof from exemplarity is noted.

In a series of appendices, some texts are transcribed (another redaction of *Summa*, 21, 4; a passage from a commentary on the *Liber de Causis* attributed to Henry, which the author thinks is either inauthentic or very early). There are also a bibliography of sources, an index of texts cited, and an index of names.

Thèmes et textes mystiques. Recherche de critères en mystique comparée. **By Louis Gardet. Paris: Alsatia, 1958. Pp. 219. Paper.**

The subject of mysticism can be treated only inadequately by a philosopher, but he can learn much of philosophical importance from a profound theological treatment such as the present work. This book is built on the

distinction between natural and supernatural mysticism, previously proposed by the author and by other specialists. Here, however, the emphasis is rather on the criteria of "authentic mysticism." The illusions and deviant forms, according to the author, are characterized by esotericism (with its tendency to reduce all statements about transcendent reality to myth or allegory), by the substitution of a psychological technique deemed to be infallibly efficacious in place of the asceticism of love (and, as far as supernatural mysticism is concerned, even in place of the free gifts of God), and finally by the confusion between the two, or even the preference of the natural mysticism over the supernatural.

The larger part of the book (pp. 79-216) is devoted to the presentation of texts in French translation arranged according to exposition of the first part.

Unamuno. Bosquejo de una Filosofía. **By José Ferrater Mora. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1957. Pp. 141. Paper.**

This revised edition has been in large measure rewritten. The last two chapters (on the idea of fiction and that of reality) are new, and the bibliography has been brought up to date. The presentation is highly sympathetic—the author insists that Unamuno's thought cannot be adequately understood except by a process of "interiorization." The work is useful for the understanding of Unamuno's thought and to the same extent for similar themes in contemporary thought.

Weltbild und Metaphysik. **By Albert Auer and Beda Thum, O.S.B. Munich: Anton Pustet, 1958. Pp. 143.**

The two authors offer quite different approaches to one and the same problem. Professor Auer views the notion of "the world image" as an infra-philosophical stage. He begins with a consideration of "the world" and "*mv* world" in a phenomenological sense, pointing out that its function is to give meaning to individual things and events. He next maintains that most German "world images" are of an idealist character, showing this with many examples. He concludes with an effort to show that an adequate "world image" is impossible without a sound metaphysics and in particular without a Christian world picture.

Dom Beda Thum has a quite different point of view. He first criticizes sharply all positivistic explanations of science, saying that M. Maritain's view is "almost positivistic" and then forgetting the qualification. Science is to be interpreted realistically, he claims (a forced realism of the objects of science or a realistic acceptance of science as it is?). From this

point of view, he holds for a critical realism; he holds that philosophy must give the ultimate interpretation of science and thus also of the "world image." In this, he also criticizes sharply the whole notion of "philosophy of spirit" (*Geistphilosophie*) and maintains that we must go back to a view of being which includes both the nonliving and the cognitive agents.

BOOK REVIEWS

ALDEN L. FISHER, *Saint Louis University*

Freud and the 20th Century. **Ed. and selected by Benjamin Nelson. New York: Meridian Books, 1957. Pp. 314.**

Faith, Reason and Modern Psychiatry. Sources for a Synthesis. **Ed. Francis J. Braceland. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1955. Pp. xv + 310.**

Le chrétien devant la psychanalyse. **By Maryse Choisy. Paris: Librairie P. Téqui, 1955. Pp. 216.**

Each of the following books is representative in its own way of a significant intellectual phenomenon of the mid-twentieth century: the continuing and growing impact of depth psychology, and particularly Freudian psychoanalysis, on disciplines far beyond the confines of psychiatry and psychopathology proper. These books (and parts of them—two are symposia) are not of equal value in themselves or of equal interest to the philosopher, but not one of them fails to raise some issues and pose some problems of real concern and interest to the intellectual historian as well as to the systematic philosopher.

The first of these, *Freud and the Twentieth Century*, represents another achievement on the part of the publishers of Meridian Books in presenting important works in original paper-back editions. Competently edited by Benjamin Nelson, it brings together a truly outstanding group of collaborators whose contributions are arranged into six groupings: "Mid-Century Perspectives," "Men and Times," "The Sciences of Mind and Health," "Society and Politics," "Literature and the Arts," and "Philosophy and Religion." Besides the careful documentation of the articles contained in each of these sections, the volume is also equipped with a well-selected bibliography of genuine value to the specialist as well as to the general reader.

It would be impossible in a short review to list, much less discuss, each of the interesting and valuable contributions to this symposium. Rather, we shall confine ourselves to a few remarks concerning those articles of special interest to philosophers.

Frederick J. Hacker, in his stimulating article, "Freud, Marx and Kierkegaard," undertakes the somewhat unusual task of comparing the thought of these very disparate thinkers. Freud's familiarity with Marx facilitates somewhat the first comparison. Both Freud and Marx sought to

uncover the hidden but scientific laws of human development—the one individual, the other social. Both men, in their own way, sought to bring about the liberation of mankind. But, in the end, Freud and Marx parted ways over the latter's "idealism." Freud had no sympathy for Utopias and was well aware that a classless society would not eliminate human aggression. Freud could not but consider the Marxian dream another illusion, another attempt of man to deceive himself.

Superficially there would seem to be nothing but extreme contrast between both the personalities of Kierkegaard and Freud and their thought. It is the author's thesis, however, that they are complementary thinkers. Taking as a common theme their deep concern with the problem of anxiety, Hacker goes on to show that Freud attempted to describe in great clinical detail *how* anxiety comes about; the Kierkegaardian analysis concentrates rather on an elucidation of the existential significance of anxiety, contending that man must be anxious if he is to be free—that anxiety is freedom. Both Kierkegaard and Freud deplored all attempts to escape from concrete reality. But here the fundamental difference between Freud and Kierkegaard would seem to be more radical than Hacker would suggest. For Kierkegaard, freedom and anxiety go hand in hand; only by a "leap of faith" can man escape anxiety; in so doing he also loses freedom. But, if for Kierkegaard to be free is to be anxious, for Freud to be anxious is to be enslaved; by overcoming anxiety through personal insight a measure, at least, of freedom is attained.

This raises the issue, touched on by several other writers in the books under consideration here, of the relation and differences between pathological anxiety discovered and dealt with by psychiatry and "existential" anxiety, a theme common to Heidegger and Sartre as well as Kierkegaard. It does not seem to this reviewer that this problem has been successfully resolved.

In his usually perceptive fashion, Will Herberg ("Freud, the Revisionists, and Social Reality") attempts to assess something of Freud's impact upon the social sciences and their present understanding of man. He gives a careful comparison of the thought of Fromm (a revisionist) and Freud, in which, for all the shortcomings of both, Freud comes off the better because of his ability to look reality in the face—to avoid Utopian hopes of achieving a perfect world as seems to be the dream of Fromm. Finally, with sure insight into the significance of both psychoanalysis and religious faith, Herberg shows that many of the recent attempts on the part of neo-Freudians to legitimize religious faith within psychoanalytic theory end in a perversion of the true import of "biblical faith." (Herberg speaks of

Masserman, but his remarks often apply equally well to Jung.) "Incredible as it may seem, Freud, with his *rejection* of religion was closer to, or at least less distant from, the biblical position" than many of the "pro-religionists" who attempt to vindicate it.

Although one may disagree rather completely with the conception of philosophy put forward by Abraham Kaplan in "Freud and Modern Philosophy" ("philosophy is culture become self-conscious; the business of philosophy, to rationalize revolutions in culture") and consequently with some of his conclusions, one must admire his systematic examination of the relevance of Freudian discoveries to the traditional problems of philosophy in the areas of epistemology, aesthetics, ethics, social science and social philosophy, and religion. One inconsistency, however, cannot be overlooked. Kaplan very ably defends Freud against the genetic fallacy as concerns the significance attached to the moral conscience; yet, in spite of his claim to the contrary, he seems himself to fall into this same fallacy with respect to religious belief.

Maritain's contribution, "Freudianism and Psychoanalysis—A Thomist View," is a revision of an essay which appeared in *Scholasticism and Politics*. Readers are undoubtedly aware of the excellence of this carefully critical but nonetheless sympathetic confrontation of Freud and Thomism. Suffice it to note here that one could scarcely ask for a more perceptive exposition of the aims and methods of analytic therapy in a few short pages than Maritain presents in the first section of his essay.

In his article, "Human Creativity and Self-Concern in Freud," Reinhold Niebuhr first compares Freud with the thinkers of "the Age of Enlightenment," with whom Freud must, in a sense, be counted but with whom his realism forced him to disagree radically over their shallow, even sentimental, optimism. Without wishing to do so, Freud thus forced a return to a more traditional view of man which in many ways comes close to the Christian notion of "original sin." But Niebuhr justly criticizes him, as does Maritain, for neglecting the positive and spiritual dimensions of human freedom with the ancillary possibility of self-transcendence.

These brief remarks cannot, of course, do justice to the diversity and general excellence of all the contributions to this symposium. But it is hoped that enough has been said to indicate that this volume makes a uniformly high-level contribution to the formidable task of placing Freud in perspective in the intellectual history of the twentieth century.

The remainder of the books to be considered here have this in common, that they are all the works of Catholic thinkers. This would seem to indicate on the part of Catholic thinking in general a growing maturity with respect to the positive importance of psychiatry and clinical psychology as opposed to the "supernaturalism" so prevalent a few years ago.

Faith, Reason and Modern Psychiatry is an impressive volume edited by F. J. Braceland, eminent Catholic psychiatrist and past president of the American Psychiatric Association. The aim of the book is to continue the dialogue between psychiatry, philosophy, and religion. To further this aim five outstanding practicing psychiatrists—Braceland, Rudolf Allers, Juan J. Lopez Ibor, Gregory Zilboorg, and Karl Stern—contributed papers concerned with the broader implications of their work. The first section of the book is entitled "Physician and Patient Confront the Cosmos." The second section, "Essays toward Interpenetration," is made up of papers by philosophers and theologians—Vincent E. Smith, Dorothy Donnelly, Pedro Láin Entralgo, Noël Mailloux, O.P., and Jordan Aumann, O.P.,—who carry on the dialogue from the viewpoint of their own specialties. While all of the authors share a common background of religious commitment, they differ markedly in their theoretical approach to psychiatry and their philosophical views. This, of course, is one of the values of a symposium of this kind.

It is interesting to note (whether any generalizations can be drawn from this is another question) that the contributions of the psychiatrists to this volume make for more significant reading for philosophers and theologians than do the contributions of the specialists in these matters. Whereas the psychiatrists seem very well aware of the nature of philosophical and theological problems and methods of reasoning, the reverse is much less true.

Each of the psychiatrists, while recognizing his deep indebtedness to Freud, makes efforts at re-evaluating Freud. Particularly, they are in common agreement concerning the need to reinterpret his findings in more adequate frames of reference than his own reductionist mechanism. All commonly recognize that, in the last analysis, Freud, correctly understood and interpreted, is much more compatible with Christian faith than many neo-Freudians and especially Jung. The misconception that Jung's religious and mystical speculations make him more acceptable to true faith is gradually but forcefully being dispelled.

Another noteworthy fact is their common interest in the contributions of the existentialist thinkers to a better understanding of their own specialty. This is not to say that there is any wholesale acceptance of existentialist philosophy; but there is a recognition that the subtle analyses of the human existent by the existentialists have brought about a richer and deeper understanding of man's concrete reality—in contrast to the abstractions of the idealists and rationalists on the one hand and the equally abstract but reductionist views of scientific empiricists on the other. Reading these essays tends to confirm the conviction that existentialism and

phenomenology may help to provide the necessary bridge between traditional philosophy and the "sciences of man" which is so badly needed.

The "Thomistic" point of view is represented in this volume by Vincent Smith in "The Study of Man: An Essay in Reconstruction". Dr. Smith begins with a discussion of Aristotle's theory of "science" and demonstration. He contends that Aristotelian science is the only true science and that modern science is either false or a dialectical extension of Aristotle's natural philosophy. He then outlines his conception of Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy of human nature, a part of natural philosophy. Various modern psychologies are analyzed to show how they fall short of the certitude necessary for "true science" and in what way they are mistaken in the light of the Aristotelian-Thomistic view. Finally, Dr. Smith attempts to point out elements of modern psychology which can be made "scientific" if interpreted within an Aristotelian frame of reference.

That this represents one Thomistic view of the relations between philosophy and science is certainly the case. This view has, however, undergone serious, if not devastating criticism. In brief, this view fails to respect the analogous character of human ways of knowing and denies to modern science any proper principles of its own. Such a view inevitably leads to a kind of intellectual imperialism (which Dr. Smith correctly deplores on the part of certain modern views) which will scarcely lead to fruitful cooperation between philosophers and scientists, whether physicists or psychoanalysts.

Le chrétien devant la psychanalyse, the latest work of Maryse Choisy, eminent French psychoanalyst, is a difficult book to evaluate, for it is really several books (or should have been)—not all of equal value. It is, first, a defense of the compatibility in therapeutic practice of psychoanalysis and Christianity (in the case at hand, Catholicism). Quoting liberally from the address of Pope Pius XII to the fifth International Congress of Psychotherapy and Clinical Psychology meeting in Rome (April 13, 1953), the author effectively argues that analytic technique can be divorced from some, at least, of Freud's theoretical and philosophical views. The author's attempt to resolve the knotty question of the positive role of value within the analytic situation is less successful. Secondly, Mme. Choisy gives a popular but excellent exposition of the aims and methods of analytic therapy (including certain recent changes of emphasis). A third part of the book, by far the most questionable, is devoted to an exposition of the author's latest theoretical speculations concerning the instinct of aggression. (One wonders what possible relevance the reactions of senile cats to certain rejuvenating drugs can have for an understanding of human behavior.) Finally, the author attempts to trace the boundaries between the roles of analyst and confessor, scientist and theologian. While her conclusions are

not particularly new, they are cautious and carefully drawn. Since much of this book makes valuable reading for the nonspecialist, it is unfortunate that the author has seen fit to include in one volume both popular exposition of well-established positions and highly tentative technical theory.

CARL F. TAEUSCH, *Saint Louis University (Emeritus)*

The Coming World Civilization. **By William Ernest Hocking. New York: Harper & Bros., 1956. Pp. xiv + 210. $3.75.**

After Utopia. **By Judith N. Shklar. Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. x + 309. $5.00.**

The Origins of Marxian Thought. **By Auguste Cornu. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1957. Pp. viii + 128. $3.75.**

The Urge to Mass Destruction. **By Samuel J. Warner. New York: Grune & Stratton, 1957. Pp. xii + 188. $3.50.**

Citadel, Market and Altar. **By Spencer Heath. Baltimore: Science of Society Foundation, 1957. Pp. xxiv + 259. $6.00.**

The first book is typically Hocking: an intellectually integrated continent, mystical, with a sincere and fervent purposefulness. The thesis, that Christianity must be the core of world unity, more broadly implies that religion is the heart of any matter. Hocking rejects the political and legal state as impotently inadequate, as well as the rhythmic view of history; the memory of his *Rethinking Missions* and his frequent references to *The Meaning of God in Human Experience* reassure the reader of the empirical background of his mysticism and idealism. He explicitly emphasizes these major implications: the integrated personal character, the cumulative accretions of history, and the timeless qualities of meaning. We wish that this tough-minded philosopher could be added to our soldiers and politicians and businessmen to deal with men like Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung.

Mrs. Shklar's book is a pessimistic contrast to Hocking's. Her thesis, that we are experiencing the decline of political faith, is supported by her apparently compendious bibliography and her well-documented text. But even so, her relatively limited selections of materials and periods of time recall Danny Kaye's remark to Kink George VI, "The trouble with you, King, is that you don't run around enough with the right people." The book begins with the enlightenment period; hence the author requires some close-knit chapters to include previous pertinent events; and the last

century or two of apparent decline in political thought are too short in the over-all span of history to be significant. Even during this more recent period there have been some brilliant outbursts of political behavior and thinking. The answer to what the author terms "romantic frustration and Christian fatalism" may not be only her "skepticism." It may also lie in the persistent individual efforts—say, to realize constitutional democracy—which Bacon held to be the secret of advancing natural science.

Cornu bites deeper into history than does Mrs. Shklar; at least he goes back to the Renaissance. It is not until he is half way through his book, after developing romanticism and following the Hegelian left into liberal and social radicalism, that he comes to Marx's own works, which he then copiously annotates. Underlying the whole work is the problem of implication. How much can be developed a priori, and how much depends on the pragmatic results? Marx delved into the problem of heredity versus environment, but he never resolved the problem to the extreme of a Lysenko. And though he experienced successively the different stages of industrialism in Germany, France, and England, he nowhere seemed to anticipate the a-fortiori methods of Lenin or Stalin—or even the differential analysis which Djilas, in *The New Class*, makes of materialistic as well as cultural developments, geographically as well as historically.

From its title, one would expect in *The Urge to Mass Destruction* an analysis of the present world crisis; and this it perhaps implies. Warner, a psychotherapist, makes three approaches to the problem: a set of clinical individual diagnoses, a historical-literary analysis of the "satan" concept, and a well-documented study of Nietzsche. Through a reference to Bertrand Russell's warnings, Warner stresses the danger of the "making of a philosophy of life out of the convulsive upheavels of mental disease." He regards the present trend to be "against the Judaic-Christian principle of love and toward a principle of individual power." Therapeutically, he also holds, the worst thing that one can do to such people is to scold or threaten them —with guns, one may add, especially when they themselves are armed!

Citadel, Market and Altar is a valiant attempt by a benevolent Quaker engineer to make rhyme or reason out of the "booming, buzzing universe." Echoes of Herbert Spencer, John Fitch's *Meaning of Infancy*, and Maine's *Ancient Law* result in another Walter B. Cannon's *Wisdom of the Body* or Plato's *Republic*. And why not? We should welcome all attempts, especially from professional amateurs, to set the world right. Perhaps there is a connection between the mathematical accuracy of a snowflake or a beehive and its human or social significance. But the author regards land ownership as the basis or sum-total of economics, and he pays little or no

attention to corporate or industrial developments. And citadel and altar are regarded too largely as instrumental to market, without considering their good or bad functioning as ends.

NICHOLAS RESCHER, *Lehigh University*

Methods and Criteria of Reasoning. **By Rupert Crawshay-Williams. New York: Humanities Press, 1957. Pp. 296. $5.00.**

This is an avowed treatise on philosophical methodology, a genre not conducive to easy readability, let alone fascination. True to type, the book is slow going. There is, however, a reward in the presentation of a coherent and significant conception of analytical method. But unfortunately the materials for a first-rate paper may lack the flexibility to stretch out into a good book.

The point of view propounded by Crawshay-Williams is epitomized in the following passage:

> Suppose, for example, that I have in my house two printed and bound bundles of paper with grey covers, both marked *Mind*, Vol. LX, No. 238. If I refer to these bundles of paper and ask whether they are the same, my question as it stands will be indeterminate, since they are the same for some purposes and different for others. For the purpose of reading them, they are the same; for the purpose of marking ownership they may well be different (pp. 48-49).

This example is generalized in the present work into a doctrine I propose to term "linguistic contextual pragmatism." Outside of mathematics and the exact sciences, it is contended, statements have no meaning *per se* but derive their meaning from their specific context and are thus purpose-dependent. To ignore this and to suppose that statements are meaningful in abstraction from their concrete contexts is to commit what Crawshay-Williams condemns as the fallacy of "universal context assumption." He recommends that wherever disagreement persists despite agreement on all strictly factual considerations, "we should treat the statement as inadequately determined at least until we have made its context clear enough to transform the question at issue into one which is plainly a question of method" (p. 251).

The fallacy of universal context assumption is, it is charged, inherent in all traditional philosophizing. Take the problem of personal identity. Is

Smith "the same person" that he was ten years ago? In the context of his relations with his estranged spouse, the answer may be no, while in regard to criminal liability it must be yes. The philosopher who raises the question *in general*, in abstraction from specific contexts, is concerned with a question that is quite futile—not quite "meaningless" (as with the positivists) but rather merely "indeterminate." In such context-detachments, Crawshay-Williams finds the reason "why certain kinds of theoretical and philosophical controversy are so oddly intractable." Philosophers mistakenly assume that categories and conceptual classifications can be established *simpliciter*, a situation which is, in reality, quite different. "Given that we are paying attention to two qualities A and B, we will need—in some contexts and for some purposes— to class them together. But—in other contexts and for other purposes—we will need to differentiate them" (p. 32).

A tacit, unargued, hidden assumption which, to my mind, wholly vitiates the philosophical implications drawn by the author from his linguistic contextual pragmatism is that only *practical* purposes and contexts can render statements determinate, and never such theoretical or intellectual purposes as, for example, those of the philosopher. Thus even if we grant, as I think we ought, the thesis of the context-dependence of meaning, we are by no means constrained to follow Crawshay-Williams down the road of dismissing traditional philosophy as discourse rendered "indeterminate" through context-abstraction. For the implication is not this but rather the need for a careful and detailed study of philosophical writings to master *their* contexts and *their* purposes. There is no hope of understanding a philosopher if we lazily resort to the Procrustean device of fitting *his* language to *our* verbal contexts.

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Dominant Themes of Modern Philosophy. **By George Boas. New York: Ronald Press, 1957. Pp. vii + 660. $6.75.**

So frequently has modern philosophy been written in the form of the Hegelian system that many tend to conceive the actual situation by imposing the system frame of reference upon the problems of the major philosophers—with, of course, some attempt at showing how the minor philosophers are merely corollary phases of the major systems. This book adopts a firm position in opposition to the Hegelian-Windelband interpretation. Writing from the position of the "history of ideas," the author is concerned not with the man but with the "unit ideas" (a term used

by A. O. Lovejoy, to whom the author is indebted). Consequently there is not a primary concern with the profound thinkers, except in those cases where such men most adequately represent the tendencies of an âge. And these tendencies of an age, from the philosophical perspective, can be seen in the philosophical problems or themes. This book therefore does not purport to be a complete exposition of any system. The author selects what appears to him to be the "most frequently recurring questions or the most influential answers" (p. v). The starting point is the rejection of authority during the Italian Renaissance; the concluding chapter is on the existentialism of Kierkegaard, Jaspers, and Sartre.

The modern period of philosophy is rooted within unresolved tensions in the medieval world. These tensions center around the problems of authority and the relationship of reason and faith. In this area the author surpasses Gilson in insight but not in explicitness. The more immediate roots of modern philosophy are located within the problems posed by the Italian Renaissance: the limits and scope of authority; the ground of truth; and the distinction, at least politically, between what *is* and what *ought*. The first half of the book—up to Leibniz—shows generalized concern with both the epistemological problems posed as a consequence of the questioning of authority and the implicit and presupposed nature of the universe which permitted epistemological investigations. Both of these reach something of an explicit awareness in Leibniz. The chapter entitled "Les philosophes" shows the author at his best. Here we find a consideration of Bayle, Montesquieu, Voltaire, d'Holbach, and La Mettrie. These men, although they proposed a total re-examination of all things, even their own past, still had the implicit belief that there was a unity, a harmony, within the totality. In spite of the fact that at times Boas is not explicit enough, he surely does point to, and takes into vigorous consideration, the implicit beliefs within which a philosopher can pose questions. In opposition to the impression most frequently conveyed—namely, that a person can actually be a total skeptic—Boas certainly emphasizes that skepticism can function only within a total frame of belief. It is not a question of whether a thinker is skeptic or believer. One must know toward what objects or ideas a thinker overtly expresses belief or skepticism, and toward what objects or ideas a thinker holds belief or skepticism that is beyond direct examination.

An extended treatment of Kant and his problems—over one hundred pages—sets the theme for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Kant's examination of problems in the area of epistemology involves the entire nature of the universe and consequently has its effects in the rapidly

growing natural sciences. One has the feeling that Hegel is disposed of too readily. The author makes no attempt at detailing the course of philosophy since Hegel; merely the general direction is indicated. This results in a passing over of such movements as neo-realism, critical realism, logical positivism, and neo-Thomism; but then this is an option reserved for an author.

The author has the humility of a philosopher who is making a very conscious, deliberate, and personal search into the history of philosophy, as opposed to those who would prefer us to believe they are merely transcribing while the historical facts speak for themselves. This is a fine book; one can only hope it will get the wide attention it deserves.

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Bradwardine and the Pelagians. A Study of His 'De Causa Dei' and Its Opponents. **By Gordon Leff. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1957. Pp. 282, with index. $6.00.**

Chaucer immortalized the name of "the learned Doctor Bradwardine" in his *Canterbury Tales*, but English scholars have been strangely incurious about the doctrines of this fourteenth-century theologian and the reasons for his popularity at that period. This is all the more remarkable because of the influence of Bradwardine upon Wyclif and English theology of the Reformation. As Gordon Leff says in his introduction, "A study of Thomas Bradwardine has been long overdue."

Mr. Leff divides his book into two parts. In the first he examines the central teachings of Bradwardine's *De Causa Dei*—an immense book which none but the bravest would attempt to digest in a few pages. An analysis is presented of its main ideas, including the existence and nature of God, creation, sin, grace, merit, free will, and God's knowledge of the contingent future. As the title indicates, Bradwardine was preoccupied with upholding God's cause and with refuting errors opposed to His freedom and omnipotence. Like so many other theologians living in the aftermath of the condemnation, in 1277, of Averroism and other forms of naturalism, he jealously protected the rights of God against every supposed encroachment of nature.

Bradwardine selected for special criticism those whom he called "modern Pelagians." The second part of Mr. Leff's book concerns Pelagianism old and new, the reasons why Bradwardine so vehemently opposed the revival of Pelagianism in his day, and finally the identification of the "modern

Pelagians." Pelagius exalted man's natural powers and denied the necessity of grace for salvation. The Pelagians of Bradwardine's day did not deny the need of grace for salvation in the present scheme of things; what they did deny was God's inability to make other arrangements for man's salvation if he chose to do so. Thus Ockham taught that God can, if He wishes, "accept a man as deserving of eternal glory without his possessing grace, and, correspondingly, He can damn him without his having sinned" (pp. 191-92). Of course, Ockham did not think this to be true in the present plan of salvation, so that one should not say, as Mr. Leff does, that "habits, for Ockham, therefore, have no part to play in leading a man to God" (pp. 193-94). Ockham was thinking of a *possible* world and not the one in which we live. He wished to ensure the freedom of God in planning man's salvation. As Mr. Leff rightly remarks, "It would be more precise to say that it is not man so much as God who is free from grace: because His acts are not made conditional upon it, neither are His creatures" (p. 197). A strange kind of Pelagianism indeed!

Some of the most enlightening sections of the book are devoted to the little-known theologians Durandus, Peter Auriol, Robert Holcot, Thomas Buckingham, and Adam of Woodham, as representative of Bradwardine's modern Pelagianism. The current nominalism was leading these men to skepticism and the denial of any necessity within the created order. The sphere of nature tended to be disregarded; and this, coupled with an acute awareness of the absolute freedom of God, led to their bizarre conclusions and opened the way for the theological errors of the Reformation concerning grace and free will.

Incidentally, it seems likely that the name of Henry of Harclay should be added to the list of Bradwardine's Pelagians. According to Franz Pelster, Harclay taught that created grace is not an absolute necessity for salvation; God can freely accept man's acts as meritorious without grace (*Scholastik*, 1953, p. 238).

Throughout the book the author's handling of theological problems does not equal his ability as a historian. His misunderstanding of the issue of grace and free will leads him to attribute conclusions to Bradwardine which the learned doctor himself denied; for example, that man strictly speaking does not merit (p. 85) and that he is not really free (p. 52). He claims that Bradwardine's system radically breaks with tradition by ascribing everything to God as its most immediate cause (p. 51), but this is in conformity with Thomism. Mr. Leff uses the term "divine participation" to describe the immediacy of God to every created effect. As H. Oberman points out,

Bradwardine's own term, "divine coefficiency," is better, for it is not God but creatures that participate in causality. (Cf. *Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine. A Fourteenth Century Augustinian* [Utrecht, 1957] p. 77, n. 1.)

Some of the author's judgments in philosophical matters are no less open to question. It is hardly exact to say that Bradwardine's "opinion of God's relation to His creatures moves on Aristotelian lines" (p. 18), for Aristotle knew nothing of creation. The proof of God's existence as Necessary Being is clearly Avicennian and not Aristotelian (pp. 25-26). For St. Thomas, a universal has no "metaphysical entity" besides its logical entity (p. 89).

These and similar flaws mar the quality of the book and make it impossible to recommend it without serious reservations. It does, however, throw light on some aspects of Bradwardine's thought, and it will be useful to students of late medieval philosophy and theology.

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